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INTRODUCTION

Do state courts-say, the courts of California-have the power to
prescribe the standards of conduct that should apply to events in
another state-say, Massachusetts? Is this power lesser or greater than
the power of the California legislature to enact extraterritorial laws?
And if these two powers are different in scope, to what extent and
why?
To illustrate this rather abstract problem, an example may be
helpful. Suppose gun manufacturers have the ability to design guns
using a trigger design that, while much more expensive, causes fewer
accidental deaths.1 Suppose that California would like to promote
usage of the safer design as widely as possible, even among gun manufacturers who operate out of state. There might be several reasons, of
course, why California wishes its laws to have broad geographical
scope. California might have an interest that most people would
regard as legitimate. It might be the case, for example, that most guns
brought into or stored in California are manufactured in other states.
Or perhaps California simply wants to make its power felt as widely as
possible. But whatever the reason, California would like to change the
conduct of gun manufacturers outside California as well as within it.
Does California have the power to do this?
Conventional choice-of-law theory gives us two answers, depending on the route that California takes. Suppose California attempts to
affect the manufacturers' nationwide behavior through the imposition
of damages or the issuance of injunctions in California courts. If it
does so, few constitutional alarms are likely to be sounded. Indeed,
according to Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague,2 state courts may apply
whatever law they please so long as the state possesses a "significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, with the parties
and the occurrence or transaction." 3 This standard strongly resembles the "minimum contacts" test for personal jurisdiction, and-especially outside the class action context4-it
is normally a fair
assumption that, so long as a state court has personal jurisdiction over
the defendant, it probably has the power to apply forum law to her
1 I choose this example deliberately; gun regulation has in fact been central to
the debate over extraterritorial application of state law. See, e.g., Allen Rostron, The
Supreme Court, the Gun Industry, and the Misguided Revival of Strict TerritorialLimits on the
Reach of State Law, 2003 L. REv. MICH. ST. U.-DETROIT C.L. 115.

2
3
4

449 U.S. 302 (1981).
Id. at 308 (plurality opinion).
See discussion infra Part I.B.1.
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actions as well. 5 This assumption is also relatively uncontroversial;
after decades of academic efforts to expunge territorial formalism
from choice-of-law theory, 6 we are not accustomed to thinking of state
courts' routine choice-of-law decisions as raising serious extraterritoriality problems.
But what if the California legislature attempts to shape the manufacturers' conduct prospectively, through some form of regulation
that functions as a direct command-say, levying a fine on manufacturers unless they certify that they comply with California's safety standards in their operations nationwide? Under an orthodox choice-oflaw understanding, this form of regulation might initially appear also
to present little difficulty. In theory, both the application of forum
law by state courts and the enactment of legislation by state legislatures are simply two aspects of states' legislative jurisdiction-that is,
the power to dictate the substantive legal rules that apply to a given
situation. 7 That power would appear to be equally at play whether a
legislature purports to make its law applicable to out-of-state events or
whether a court actually applies that law to individual actors-and,
indeed, in the international context, the two powers are treated as
equivalent.8 Commentators have sometimes spoken as if the same
5 Technically, of course, it does not strictly follow that the existence of the minimum contacts necessary for personal jurisdiction means that the state can also apply
forum law: "[E]xamination of a State's contacts may result in divergent conclusions
for jurisdiction and choice-of-law purposes." Hague, 449 U.S. at 317 n.23 (plurality
opinion). Notably, for example, the choice-of-law test uses the word "significant"
while the minimum contacts test does not. Nonetheless, outside the realm of class
actions, the situations where one test will be satisfied while the other is not are few.
See Friedrich K. Juenger, The Need for a ComparativeApproach to Choice-ofLaw Problems,
73 TUL. L. REv. 1309, 1333 (1999) ("Because of the 'minimum contacts' requirement
for judicial jurisdiction, a court will rarely lack the necessary 'significant contacts.'"
(footnote omitted)). Indeed, because the Hague test permits consideration of the
plaintiffs contacts with the state as well as the defendant's, in most situations it is
narrower than the test for personal jurisdiction.
6 See Hayward D. Reynolds, The Concept of Jurisdiction: Conflicting Legal Ideologies
and Persistent Formalist Subversion, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 819, 880 (1991).
7 See Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Non-Extant Rights, 56 U.
KAN. L. REv. 227, 261 (2008); see also Willis L.M. Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78
COLUM. L. REv. 1587, 1587 (1978) ("Legislative jurisdiction ... is the power of a state
to apply its law to create or affect legal interests.").
8 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 401 (a) (1987) (explaining
that the "jurisdiction to prescribe" is the state's power "to make its law applicable to
the activities, relations, or status of persons, or the interests of persons in things,
whether by legislation, by executive act or order, by administrative rule or regulation,
or by determination of a court"). The jurisdiction to prescribe is distinguished from
the "jurisdiction to adjudicate, i.e., to subject persons or things to the process of its
courts or administrative tribunals" and the "jurisdiction to enforce, i.e., to induce or
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principle applies in interstate relations as well 9-and, at least at first
glance, there seems no obvious reason why it should not. After all, the
basic nature of the power to set substantive standards applicable to
out-of-state conduct would seem to be the same whether that power is
exercised by a legislature or a court.
We know, however, that this cannot be the whole story-first, and
primarily, because an important, if sometimes poorly understood,10
extraterritoriality principle constrains the reach of the laws state legislatures may enact.1 That principle may be rooted in the dormant
Commerce Clause-indeed, the Supreme Court has several times
indicated that it is-but it may be better understood as a prohibition
rooted in general structural principles of horizontal federalism.1 2 As a
result, we know that "[f]or the most part, states may not legislate
extraterritorially, whatever exactly that means. ''13 The exact scope of
this limit, however, remains notoriously unclear, and its applicability
to state courts is even foggier. Is the extraterritoriality principle a narrow one, applying only to the actions of state legislatures and/or to
the types of activities (such as state protectionism of local industries)
that are the core concern of more orthodox dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine? Or, conversely, is the extraterritoriality principle a
larger one that constrains the actions of state courts or modifies
compel compliance or to punish noncompliance with its laws or regulations." Id.
§ 401(b), (c).
9 See, e.g., Rostron, supra note 1, at 121 ("Choice of law is a matter ofjurisdiction
to prescribe. For example, when a plaintiff sues for negligence, the court must decide
which state's common law can and should apply to the claim.").
10 See Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) ExtraterritorialState Legislation, 85
MIcH. L. REV. 1865, 1884 (1987) ("[W]e do not understand the extraterritoriality
principle (the principle that states may not legislate extraterritorially) nearly as well as
we should.... [We have no acceptable account of the constitutional underpinnings
of the principle.").
11 The classic account of the extraterritoriality principle is found in Regan, supra
note 10, at 1884-913; see also Reese, supra note 7, at 1590 (arguing that the idea of
due process as the constitutional limitation on legislative jurisdiction lies in the difference between its provisions and that of full faith and credit); Alex Ellenberg, Note,
Due Process Limitations on ExtraterritorialTort Legislation, 92 CORNELL L. REv. 549, 555
(2007) ("[A] state may also exercise legislative jurisdiction over foreign conduct that
has consequences within its boundaries, although... [it] would be limited by applicable constitutional restrictions." (footnote omitted)). For a discussion of how court
issued injunctions may run afoul of the principle, see David S. Welkowitz, Preemption,
Extraterritoriality,and the Problem of State Antidilution Laws, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1, 39-40
(1992).
12 See Regan, supra note 10, at 1895.
13 Id. at 1896 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Hague's broad authorization for the application of forum law?
Because the Court's pronouncements in these areas have been so
murky and contradictory, no clear answer exists to these questions.
A second problem for the traditional account of the relationship
between legislative jurisdiction and choice of law is that the scope of
state courts' power to apply forum law to geographically remote
events-an issue that the Supreme Court seemed to have resolved in
Hague,14 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,1 5 and Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman 16-has itself been called into question. In BMW of North America,
Inc. v. Gore,1 7 the Court first suggested that constitutional limits, based

on "principles of state sovereignty and comity"'18 as well as the Due
Process Clause, 19 might exist on state courts' ability to "impose economic sanctions on violators of its laws with the intent of changing the
tortfeasors' lawful conduct in other States." 20 More recently, in State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,2 1 the Court not only

expanded upon this principle but also gave it a particular choice-oflaw spin, suggesting that the courts of one state, in seeking to impose
damages for defendants' out-of-state conduct, have an obligation to
"apply the laws of [those defendants'] relevant jurisdiction. '' 22 While

Gore and Campbell are nominally limited to awards of punitive damages, they offer no wholly convincing reason why the conceptual
framework they articulate should not apply to compensatory damages
as well, 2 3 and both courts and litigants have in some cases sought to
14 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 319-20 (1981) (plurality opinion).
15 472 U.S. 797, 802, 821 (1985).
16 486 U.S. 717, 730-31 (1988).
17 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
18 Id. at 572.
19 See id. at 562.
20 Id. at 572. In other words, "Alabama does not have the power .. to punish
BMW for conduct that was lawful where it occurred and that had no impact on Alabama or its residents." Id. at 572-73.
21 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
22 See id. at 421-22. In a third case, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S.Ct. 1057,
1060 (2007), the Court considered the extent to which harm to third parties can be
considered in punitive damages analysis, although it did not consider the problem of
extraterritoriality per se.
23 An obvious basis for a compensatory/punitive distinction-and one on which
the Supreme Court appeared to rely-is that punitive damages resemble a criminal
sanction more than civil law. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 417; Gore, 517 U.S. at 572-73 &
n.19. But a variety of commentators have long assumed that states enjoy approximately the same latitude to apply criminal laws to out-of-state conduct as they do to
apply civil laws under Hague. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, FederalExtraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1217, 1242 (1992)
(arguing that civil and criminal jurisdiction are treated "only slightly differently," but
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extend their holdings to choice-of-law practice more generally. 24
Thus, Gore and Campbellsuggest that a more general extraterritoriality
prohibition lurks somewhere in the Constitution, having nothing to
do with the dormant Commerce Clause or Hague's "aggregation of
contacts" test, and potentially applying to the activities of courts as
well as legislatures.
Given these contradictory signals, the current situation is as follows. State legislatures appear to be subject to some prohibition
against enacting laws with an extraterritorial reach-although the
exact scope and textual basis of this stricture is not perfectly clear. At
the same time, state courts enjoy great apparent latitude to apply the
law of their choosing to geographically far-flung disputes 2 5-but the
Supreme Court has at times suggested that problems of extraterritoriality may also attend the exercise of state court power. This doctrinal
muddle has proven complicated for litigants and courts, and fails to
provide any clear guidance to states or their citizens about how far
state power may legitimately extend.
This Article suggests ways in which current doctrine might be
reconsidered and its two main strands harmonized. In particular, it
considers the question of whether the power exercised by state legislatures over out-of-state conduct differs meaningfully from that exercised by state courts. Is there a principled justification for treating the
exertion of power over out-of-state events differently depending on
whether it is done by a court or a legislature? Or do state courts and
state legislatures embody state power in similar ways such that the

that fewer cases exist in the criminal realm, perhaps because states are less likely to
"press the limits of the Constitution" than individual litigants); Richard H. Fallon,Jr.,
If Roe Were Overruled: Abortion and the Constitution in a Post-Roe World, 51 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 611, 630 (2007) ("[T] here is reason to think that the Supreme Court would assess
a state's efforts to apply its criminal laws to out-of-state events by employing a contactsbased framework similar to that which it employs in gauging the permissibility of a
state's application of its civil laws to transactions occurring out of state.").
24

See Rostron, supra note 1, at 151.

25 Note that this power is not simply a matter of either personal jurisdiction or
choice-of-law principles; it is the result of the way in which both these doctrines intersect. Minimum contacts-based personal jurisdiction demands only a tenuous territorial connection in the first instance between the forum and the dispute; the notion
that only modest constitutional constraints exist on states' choice-of-law analysis then
permits states to apply forum law (or another law of their choosing) broadly to the
events that come before them. Thus, the end result is that, say, a Colorado court has
broad power both to hear and to apply Colorado law to events taking place almost
entirely outside Colorado. This phenomenon will be explored in more depth later in
this Article.
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extraterritorial implications of their actions should be assessed accord26
ing to the same or similar standards?
In attempting to answer these questions, this Article proceeds in
three parts. In the first Part, it surveys current notions of extraterritoriality as they have evolved in choice-of-law principles and in legislation. It begins by looking at various models of how we might regard
extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction. It then moves on to consider
the two frameworks articulated by the Supreme Court for analyzing
the issue of state power over out-of-state conduct: one grounded in
the Due Process Clause 27 and imposing limits on choice-of-law decisions; the other ostensibly rooted in the dormant Commerce Clause
and aimed at extraterritorial legislation.
The second Part of this Article considers the ways in which lines
of division between choice-of-law limits and legislative extraterritorial26 The Article deliberately focuses on issues of civil regulation and liability, since
criminal proceedings raise somewhat different questions of due process and state
power, although some of its examples are drawn from cases treating criminal liability
and much of its analysis may be relevant to the criminal context as well. In addition,
this Article does not discuss at length the much-debated issue of whether states have
the power to regulate the extraterritorial activities of their citizens-a question that
entails consideration of a variety of constitutional provisions not discussed in this article, including the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Fourteenth
Amendment Citizenship Clause, and the constitutional right to travel. See Seth F.
Kreimer, Lines in the Sand: The Importance of Borders in American Federalism,150 U. PA. L.
REv. 973, 973 (2002) (responding to and rejecting Rosen's argument); Mark D.
Rosen, Extraterritorialityand PoliticalHeterogeneity in American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L.

REV. 855, 863-64 (2002) [hereinafter Rosen, Extraterritoriality] (claiming that states do
and should have the power to regulate their citizens' extraterritorial activities); Mark
D. Rosen, "Hard"or "Soft" Pluralism?:Positive, Normative, and InstitutionalConsiderations
of States' ExtraterritorialPowers, 51 ST. Louis U. LJ. 713, 731-38 (2007) [hereinafter

Rosen, "Hard" or "Soft" Pluralism] (considering and rejecting the possibility that,
under current doctrine, these provisions might restrain states' ability to regulate their
citizens' extraterritorial conduct). While recognizing the importance of this debate
to a comprehensive consideration of the extraterritoriality problem, I choose not to
address it here for a number of reasons. First, it has most often been considered in
the context of criminal statutes. Second, it is a largely theoretical topic; few states
have actually asserted their right to exercise this power. See Rosen, Extraterritoriality,
supra, at 860 ("[F]ew states have tried to frustrate travel-evasion by regulating their
citizens' out-of-state activities."). Finally, and most important, I would argue that the
issue of states' power to regulate the extraterritorial conduct of their citizens is bound
up in the debate of the proper relationship between states and their citizenry-an
issue quite separate from the question of the degree to which states can project their
power to encompass the out-of-state activities of strangers. See Rosen, "Hard"or "Soft"

Pluralism, supra, at 745-48 (discussing various considerations involved in the question
of whether, as a normative matter, state citizens should have the ability effectively to
evade state law by traveling out-of-state to conduct their activities).
27 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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ity concerns have started to break down. It considers four examples of
this apparent conflation: the Supreme Court's punitive damages jurisprudence; the controversy over contractual choice of law; the problem
of legislation affecting the Internet that crosses geographical lines;
and the possibility that extraterritoriality principles might limit the
issuance of nationwide injunctions or other state court remedies.
Finally, the third Part of this Article considers how the apparent
discrepancies between choice-of-law limits and the legislative extraterritoriality principle can be reconciled. First, it makes the case that the
standards for assessing legislative and judicial acts should be combined into a single framework. Second, it argues that, even within
such a framework, there is a case for subjecting certain kinds of state
actions to a more stringent extraterritoriality analysis. It concludes by
arguing for a standard that incorporates elements of both unification
and differentiation.
I.

EXTRATERRITORIALITY

FRAMEWORKS

It is fairly obvious that regulation by a particular jurisdiction
outside its own territory raises a constellation of concerns. Other
jurisdictions may, for example, view such regulation as an encroachment on their sovereignty and autonomy. Competing claims by various sovereigns to regulate the same behavior may lead to inconsistent
standards being applied and uncertainty on the part of actors who
wish to conform their conduct to the law. After-the-fact problems may
also arise if, for example, different jurisdictions issue inconsistent
judgments. Therefore, in both the international and interstate context, both courts and commentators have wrestled with the problem of
how to delineate and contain the territorial scope of legislation.
This Part begins by discussing prior scholarly approaches to the
problem of how state extraterritorial regulation might be considered.
It then moves on to discuss the two strands of the case law the Court
has developed to deal with domestic extraterritoriality issues: first, the
Hague standard that limits the degree to which state courts can apply
forum law; second, the limits on the extraterritorial reach of state
legislation.
A.

Theories of Extraterritoriality

The idea that there exists some prohibition against extraterritorial legislation in the interstate context has a long history. In the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court frequently expressed the view that
state power should be, in the first instance, defined territorially. Pen-
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noyer v. Neff 28 for example, while notable mostly for its understanding
of the then-limited power of state courts over out-of-state defendants,
also contains the famous statement that "the laws of one State have no
operation outside of its territory, except so far as is allowed by comity." 2 9 Likewise, in a case roughly contemporaneous with Pennoyer,
Bonaparte v. Tax Court,3 0 the Court held that neighboring states could
not exempt Maryland-issued securities from taxation, on the ground
that "[n]o State can legislate except with reference to its own
31
jurisdiction."
Following these various suggestions from the Supreme Court,
commentators have frequently argued that the Constitution establishes some limits on the degree to which states can regulate events in
other jurisdictions. An influential (though now somewhat outdated)
1978 article on legislative jurisdiction by Willis L.M. Reese argued that
the Due Process Clause restricts the degree to which states can regulate events outside their borders. 32 Reese argued that, just as the Due
Process Clause serves as "an instrument of federalism" in the personal
jurisdiction context by preventing assertions of jurisdiction that
improperly trench upon the interests of sister states, 33 so does the Due
95 U.S. 714 (1878).
Id. at 722. The Court elaborated that
every State has the power to determine for itself the civil status and capacities
of its inhabitants; to prescribe the subjects upon which they may contract,
the forms and solemnities with which their contracts shall be executed, the
rights and obligations arising from them.., and also to regulate the manner
and conditions upon which property situated within such territory, both personal and real, may be acquired, enjoyed, and transferred.
Id. Even in the post-Pennoyer "minimum contacts" world, the Court and various commentators have suggested that restrictions on personal jurisdiction are not merely a
product of the Due Process Clause; they also contain a federalism component. See,
e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (noting that
personal jurisdiction analysis should take into account such factors as "the shared
interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies").
30 104 U.S. 592 (1881); see also Regan, supra note 10, at 1887 (discussing Bonaparte and its significance).
31 Bonaparte, 104 U.S. at 594. Similar notions of the territorial limits of state
power persist in the standard currently applied to tax cases. In more recent tax cases,
the Supreme Court has required a "minimal connection" and a "rational relationship"
between the activity to be taxed and the state. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes,
445 U.S. 425, 436-37 (1980). This requirement is rooted in the Due Process Clause
and resembles both the minimum contacts test for jurisdiction and the "aggregation
of contacts" test for choice of law. See Welkowitz, supra note 11, at 42-43 (discussing
case law and noting that "behind the test for the validity of state taxation of interstate
activity is an obvious concern about extraterritorial overreaching").
32 See Reese, supra note 7, at 1589.
33 Id.
28
29
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Process Clause also impose parallel limits on states' legislative jurisdiction.3 4 In other words, Reese argued, the Due Process Clause fulfills
the same "twofold role" in legislative jurisdiction as it does in adjudicative (that is, personal) jurisdiction: it "protect[s] persons against the
unfair application of a law" while also "furthering other interstate...
values," including the particularly important notion that "a state
should not without good reason take action that would adversely
35
affect the interests of another state or states."
With these issues in mind, Reese proposed a two-part test under
the Due Process Clause to assess the permissibility of legislative jurisdiction in a particular situation: whether the act in question "would be
fair to the parties and also consistent with the needs of the federal...
system." 3 6 The key inquiry under the first part of the test would be

one of reliance-in other words, whether the party in question had
acted under the assumption that a particular jurisdiction's legal rules
would be applied to his transaction. 37 Under the second part, courts
would consider a variety of issues having to do with interstate comity.
For example, when a state lacked an "interest of its own

'3 8

in applying

its law to a given situation, it should be found to lack legislative jurisdiction unless it had substantial contacts with the situation or it was
"the state of the governing law under an established rule of choice of
law." 39 When state rules came into direct conflict, courts would con-

sider whether the application of a given state's law would "extend
beyond the reasonable scope of the state's regulatory power"-or, in
other words, "entail too great a sacrifice of the interests of other
states."

40

In a later article, Donald Regan proposed a different model of
the extraterritoriality principle, one rooted in broad notions of federalism rather than any specific constitutional provision. In Regan's
view, the Due Process Clause is an inappropriate place to locate the
principle because the constraints the principle imposes are ones "not
of fundamental fairness, but of our federalism." 4 1 Additionally, while
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 1592.
37 Id. at 1595.
38 Id. at 1599.
39 Id. at 1600. Reese felt the latter two exceptions were necessary under existing
case law. See id. at 1559-600.
40 Id. at 1602.
41 Regan, supranote 10, at 1891. Regan argued that the extraterritoriality principle cannot be rooted in the Full Faith and Credit Clause because the Clause, according to Regan, concerns a state's obligation to apply the laws of a different state, not
the limits on a state's ability to apply its own law. See id. at 1893 ("[T]here are two
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Reese saw the question of legislative jurisdiction in predominantly
choice-of-law terms-that is, what law would be applied by state courts
to situations that came before them-Regan deliberately excluded
conflicts-of-law principles from his analysis. 42 Regan further argued
that extraterritorial regulation could not be based on foreseeability or
the consequences of behavior-the principle is "about the location of
the regulated behavior itself," not that behavior's effects4 -but could
be based on the shared interests of the various states in establishing
rules of conduct for their citizens. 44 Thus, in Regan's view, a state may
not regulate extraterritorially in the sense of "introduc [ing] discriminations against nonresidents into its law in order to benefit itself or its
residents," but it may discriminate against nonresidents in ways
designed "to respect the interests of other states in the behavior, even
45
the extraterritorial behavior, of their citizens."

Much subsequent literature has focused on the constitutionality
of more specific acts of extraterritorial regulation. 46 Thus, various
scholars have considered the problem of extraterritoriality as it relates
to abortion restrictions 4 7 and gun regulation. 48 For the most part,
however, these scholars have focused on which types of legislation are
constitutional under existing case law rather than attempt to set forth
a comprehensive theory of extraterritoriality.

distinct questions, whether a state may apply its own law in a particular case, and
whether it must apply some other state's law. The extraterritoriality principle

addresses the first question, and the full faith and credit clause the second."). Further, the exercise of full faith and credit "presupposes" a valid act of legislative jurisdiction, so any extraterritoriality constraints on legislative jurisdiction must come
from another source. Id. at 1894. As discussed later in this Article, Regan believed
the Commerce Clause to be an inadequate basis for the principle as well, primarily
because extraterritoriality concerns are not limited to commercial activity. See id. at

1887-89.
42 See id. at 1885 ("I shall virtually ignore the conflicts literature.... [T] he cases I
am interested in are quite unlike the standard fare of conflicts analysis.").

43
44
45

Id. at 1899.
Id. at 1908-09.
Id. at 1912.

46 In addition, a vigorous academic debate currently exists about the power of
states to regulate their citizens' out-of-state conduct. See Kreimer, supra note 26, at
984-85; Rosen, Extraterritoriality,supra note 26, at 856-57. This Article does not treat
this debate in depth for a variety of reasons. See discussion supra note 26.
47 See C. Steven Bradford, What Happens If Roe Is Overruled? ExtraterritorialRegulation of Abortion by the States, 35 ARiz. L. RE,. 87, 88-92 (1993); Fallon, supranote 23, at

626-40.
48 See Rostron, supra note 1, at 116-20; Ellenberg, supra note 11, at 564-67.
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The Supreme Court and Extraterritoriality

In marked contrast to the international setting, the Supreme
Court has not developed a uniform standard for assessing the proper
scope of state legislative jurisdiction. Rather, it has set forth two somewhat different standards that apply in different contexts, although in
neither case has the Court clearly delineated the standard's exact limits. First, the Court has articulated constitutional limits on the extent
to which states can apply their law in their own courts. Second, the
Court has announced a set of extraterritoriality principles that apply
to invalidate certain kinds of state regulation.
1. Constitutional Limits on State Choice of Forum Law
The first-and perhaps, the primary-set of limits on state legislative jurisdiction derives from restrictions the Supreme Court has
imposed on the degree to which state courts can apply their law to the
disputes that come before them. In some ways, choice-of-law decisions
are a logical setting in which to impose restrictions on legislative jurisdiction. That is, the primary means of applying a state's regulatory law
is likely to be through the actions of state courts, whether in assessing
liability on the basis of standards supplied by state law or in issuing
injunctions that aim to compel defendants to conform their actions to
state law. Thus, imposing limits on states' ability to apply their own
law to disputes would seem to be an obvious means of limiting states'
ability to assert their power extraterritorially.
This analysis, however, is complicated by the fact that the choiceof-law doctrine itself has historically embodied separate notions of
what state territory means and how state power is territorially manifested-notions somewhat in conflict with a notion of an extraterritoriality principle that proscribes the regulation of state conduct outside
state borders. Under traditional notions of conflicts of law, state
courts have wide authority to apply state law to causes of action that
become complete within their borders, even if all relevant conduct
occurred elsewhere. 49 More modem choice-of-law traditions likewise
permit states great license to apply their own law to out-of-state events
in which they can state some plausible interest. 50 The existence of
these traditions has complicated the formulation of a meaningful
extraterritoriality principle in the choice-of-law context.
This section thus begins by looking briefly at how notions of state
power and territory have evolved in the choice-of-law theories applied
49

See infra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.

50

See infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
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in state courts. It then goes on to discuss how the Supreme Court has
attempted to fashion constitutional limits in the choice-of-law context.
a. From Territorialism to Interest Analysis
Like federal choice-of-law theory-and, perhaps more to the
point, like Pennoyer-era personal jurisdiction doctrine-choice-of-law
doctrine as applied to states has strongly territorial roots. 5 1 Early

choice-of-law theorists reconciled territorial notions of state power
with the practical need to permit transitory causes of action by developing a theory of "vested rights," under which a cause of action came
into being in a certain place upon occurrence of a particular event,
such as the nonperformance of a contract or the infliction of an injury
(the venerable torts principle known as lex loci delicti-the law of the
place of the wrong); the laws of the jurisdiction in which such an
52
event occurred would then govern the resulting cause of action.
The vested rights theory is most strongly associated with Joseph
H. Beale, who believed that as soon as the relevant elements of a cause
of action occurred in a particular place, they immediately gave rise to
a right that persisted across state borders and that courts in other
jurisdictions were bound to respect. 5 3 Some of Beale's ideas, however,
are traceable to an earlier treatise by Justice Story. 54 According to
Story, state law was only directly applicable to "all property... within
its territory; and all persons, who are resident within it... ; and also
all contracts made, and acts done within it." 5 Therefore, when juris-

dictions applied foreign law, they did so as a matter of comity, not
necessity.5

6

Although these two theories provided different justifica-

tions for the cross-jurisdictional application of foreign law-Beale
believed that foreign-created rights vested automatically, while Story
held that they were enforced only as a matter of comity-they shared
a territorial conception of state law. In other words, they both sub51 As noted, "territorial" has a distinct meaning in this context-an issue I will
address later in this paper. See discussion infra Part I.B.l.b.
52

See 2

JOSEPH H. BEALE, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICr oF LAWS

§ 61.2, at 1268,

§ 378.2, at 1289 (1935).
53 See id. §§ 377,1-378.3, at 1286-90.
54

See Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations,90 GEO. L.J. 883, 890

(2002).
55

JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 18, at 19 (Boston,

Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1834).
56 Id. § 23, at 24 ("(W] hatever force and obligation the laws of one country have
in another, depend solely upon the laws, and municipal regulations of the latter; that
is to say, upon its own proper jurisprudence and polity, and upon its own express or
tacit consent.").
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scribed to the notion that state law applied direcdy only to events
within state borders, and that the law of the state in which a cause of
action arose continued, in some sense, to govern of its own force, even
when the cause of action was heard by the courts of another state.
Of course, the very reason that choice-of-law theory is necessary
in the first instance is because chains of events leading to a cause of
action often involve more than one jurisdiction. Thus, the territorial
theories would have been meaningless without some way of establishing, in a situation where events had occurred in various places, which
state could actually claim territorial control over the events. As a
result, associated with the early territorial notions of choice of law was
a set of specific principles for determining where a cause of action
came into being-the lex loci delicti principle, for example, or the
maxim that the validity of a contract was governed by the law of the
place of contracting, while breach of contract was governed by the law
of the place of performance.5 7 These principles were, for the most
58
part, enshrined in the Restatement (First)of Conflict of Laws.

Ultimately, both the first Restatement's theoretical "vested rights"
underpinning and its practical approach came under fire from a number of reformers on grounds of both logic and policy59-for

its unnec-

essary formalism, for ignoring other valid state interests such as the
protection of state residents, and for erroneously conceiving of rights
as independently existing entities that could be shifted from court to
court without changing their basic nature. 60 Although the solutions
proposed by proponents of this "conflicts revolution" differed, many
of the proposals shifted their focus from the last-triggering-eventbased formalism of the first Restatement to choice-of-law principles
focusing on the degree to which state legislatures had legitimate interests in protecting state residents. Thus, for example, Brainerd Currie
famously advocated the use of "interest analysis," under which, when a
party urged the application of a law other than forum law, a court was
to look to the "governmental policy expressed in [forum] law" and
determine whether the forum had an interest in having its law
applied. 61 Because states normally had legitimate interests in the
57 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 332, 358 (1934).
58 See id. § 377 ("The place of wrong is in the state where the last event necessary
to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place.").
59 See, e.g., David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARv. L. REv.
173, 175 (1933); Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws,
1959 DuKE L.J. 171, 174-77; Symposium, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent
Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REv 1212 (1963).
60 See Currie, supra note 59, at 174-77.
61 See id. at 178.
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application of their law only when the welfare of their residents was at
stake, governmental interest analysis necessarily tended to shift the
focus from the location where events occurred to the domicile of the
62
litigants as the principal concern of choice-of-law doctrine.
A further-and, for the purposes of this discussion, significantinsight of the reformers was that foreign state law did not apply in the
courts of another state of its own force; rather, all law applied by the
courts of a given state was an aspect of what was known as "local law."6 3
Thus, if, say, a Massachusetts court decided that a given dispute before
it should be governed by Connecticut law, it did so not because Connecticut law applied of its own force (as Beale would have it) or
because (as Story might say) Massachusetts, as a matter of comity, permitted Connecticut law to apply in its courts. Rather, under local law
theory, Massachusetts would, in effect, apply Massachusetts law fash64
ioned into a facsimile of Connecticut law.
Local law theory itself has come in for its share of derision; Larry
Kramer has described it as "hardly constitut[ing] a major breakthrough, ' 65 the idea being that it is of only highly formal significance
whether the law applied by a Massachusetts court is "really" Connecticut law or Massachusetts law that resembles Connecticut law in every
particular. But the distinction does have potential significance in considering the extent to which the application of a particular law by a
state court represents an exercise of that state's power. If we believe
that all law applied by the courts of a given state is local law, the effect
is to obscure somewhat the distinction between legislative and adjudicative jurisdiction-since the consequence of a given state's courts
accepting jurisdiction over a dispute is, in essence, that the law of that
state will, in one form or other, apply to it. As I will explain shortly,
Supreme Court case law on choice of law's constitutional limits has in
fact resulted in the blurring of the legislative/adjudicative distinction,
even though the Supreme Court itself has not explicitly endorsed

62 See Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 1819, 1847 (2005).
63 See Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. REx'. 979, 988 (1991).
64 Id.
65 See id. at 989. Kramer relates an anecdote in which choice-of-law scholar David
Cavers explained local law theory by describing how his four-year-old son reconciled
himself to eating tuna fish by telling himself it was "'fish made of chicken."' Id.
(quoting David F. Cavers, The Two "Local Law" Theories, 63 HARV. L. Rv. 822, 823
(1950)).
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local law theory, and it is indeed in some tension with the Court's
66
current choice-of-law understanding.
The "conflicts revolution" also had some impact on the actual
practices of state courts (although not perhaps to the extent that it
influenced academic debate). Some courts developed their own revisions of old principles that were influenced by the reformers' views,
even if they did not necessarily conform to them precisely. 6 7 Amid
some confusion over the direction choice of law should take, the second Restatement adopted a catchall approach that advised courts to
choose the law of the state with the "most significant relationship" to
the cause of action-but the determination of exactly which state that
might be could potentially rest on a variety of factors. 68 Perhaps as a
result of the second Restatement's failure to take a clear stand, state
courts today differ substantially in which choice-of-law principles they
use, with several continuing to follow the first Restatement, a somewhat larger group adhering to the second Restatement, and the
69
remainder using a hodgepodge of other modern approaches.
b.

The Nature of Choice-of-Law Territorialism

Before launching into a discussion of constitutional restrictions
on application of state law to out-of-state events, it is worth considering the question of what, precisely, the concept of "territorialism"
means in the choice-of-law context. Since presumably no one ques66

See Kermit Roosevelt III, Resolving Renvoi: The Bewitchment of Our Intelligence by

Means of Language, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1821, 1845 (2005) (suggesting that local
law theory appears to create constitutional problems because it would call for the
application of forum law in situations where the state lacks the required contacts
under the Due Process Clause).
67 See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 281-84 (N.Y. 1963) (surveying
choice-of-law literature and, in particular, critiques of the vested rights approach).
68 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971). In determining which state's law should apply to a tort, for example, the second Restatement
instructed courts to look to the traditional place-of-injury criterion, but also to consider other factors: the place of conduct causing the injury, the domicile, residence,
the place of business of the parties, and the place where the parties' relationship was
centered. Id.
69 See generallySymeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2006:
Twentieth Annual Survey, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 697, 712-13 (2006) (charting each state's
choice-of-law approaches in both contract and tort law, with twenty-three states adopting the second Restatement approach in contract law, twenty-three states adopting
the second Restatement approach in tort law, twelve states adopting the first Restatement approach in contract law, ten states adopting the first Restatement approach in
tort law, ten states adopting a combined approach to contract law, six states adopting
a combined approach in tort law, seven states adopting a different modern approach
in contract law, and eleven states adopting a different approach in tort law).
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tions the right of state courts to apply forum law to events occurring
entirely within state borders, the very existence of a choice-of-law
problem presupposes that relevant events have occurred in more than
one jurisdiction. When this is the case, there is an inherent difficulty
in separating "territorial" from "nonterritorial" choice-of-law theories.
In other words, all choice-of-law theories that deal with the problem of
multijurisdictional contacts rely, to some extent, on territorial boundaries and the location of physical events. Where such theories differ is
largely in which physical circumstances they choose to privilege.
Thus, vested rights theories attach great importance to the occurrence
of the last event creating a cause of action; 70 governmental interest
analysis may rely on other factors, such as the domicile of the litigants
or the interests of the affected communities 7 1-but these are factors
that are also, inevitably, related to physical boundaries. 72 To talk
about territorialism in choice-of-law theory, therefore, is to refer to
the particular strain of territorialism that looks to the occurrence of a
specific event in a particular location as the circumstance that gives a
sovereign power to apply its law to that event. Further, even the
choice-of-law theories that are denominated as "territorial" do not
necessarily include any substantive grappling with the extent to which
states should be permitted to assert control-directly or indirectlyover conduct occurring outside their borders.
The well-known choice-of-law case Alabama G.S.R Co. v. CarrolP
illustrates this distinction. Carrollconcerned an accident involving a
freight train passing through several southern states.7 4 The accident
was allegedly caused by negligent maintenance of the train in Alabama, which caused a link between two cars to break in Mississippi,
injuring the plaintiff.75 Because the relevant conduct had occurred in

Alabama and the plaintiff had further been acting pursuant to an Alabama contract, 76 the plaintiff argued that a provision of the Alabama
Code should apply. 77 Applying traditional vested rights principles,
70
71
72
(1989)
found

See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
See Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE LJ. 1277, 1306
("Clearly there is no way to formulate a choice of law regime other than to
it upon territorial assumptions of some sort.").

73

11 So. 803 (Ala. 1892).

74

Id. at 804.

75

Id.

76 Id. at 804, 807. In addition, the plaintiff was an Alabama resident and the
defendant was an Alabama corporation. Id. at 803.
77 Id. at 805. Because Mississippi law followed the rule immunizing employers
from liability for accidents caused by a fellow employee, plaintiffs could state a claim
only under the law of Alabama, which had abandoned this rule. Id.
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however, the court rejected this argument, applying Mississippi law
because it was in Mississippi where the injury had occurred and where
a cause of action had consequently arisen. 78 As the court reasoned,
"[s] ection 2590 of the Code of Alabama had no efficacy beyond the
lines of Alabama. It cannot be allowed to operate upon facts occurring in another state, so as to evolve out of them rights and liabilities
which do not exist under the law of that state. '79 For the court, therefore, the relevant facts were those relating to the immediate occurrence of the accident and the resulting cause of action, not those
80
relating to the conduct that had caused the accident to occur.
If one understanding of territorialism is that states should have
the power to govern conduct that occurs within their territory, the
effect of the Alabama court's decision in Carrollwas to permit Mississippi law to apply extraterritorially. First Restatement theories thus in
effect allow states wide scope to assign responsibility-and assess damages and other penalties-retrospectively for conduct occurring in
another jurisdiction, provided that the last event creating the relevant
cause of action occurred in that state's territory. Note that this makes
for an understanding of state power that is somewhat different from
the equivalent notion of national power under effects-based jurisdiction in international law, since the last triggering event that creates a
vested right may not necessarily have significant consequences for the
state in which it takes place. In the Carroll example, the conduct
resulting in the cause of action had occurred in Alabama and (since
both parties were Alabama residents) had its principal effect there;
indeed, the fact that the cars happened to break in Mississippi was
purely happenstance."' Yet the vested rights theory-the standard
practice of state courts for many years-mandated the application of
82
Mississippi law to the resulting cause of action.
78

Id. at 809.

79

Id. at 806-07.

80
81

Id. at 809.
See id. at 803-04.

82

In Carroll,of course, the application of Mississippi law was an act of comity by

the Alabama court. See id. at 808-09. We might say that Carrollthus should not raise
extraterritoriality concerns because the issue was not the Alabama court's power to
apply Alabama law to the dispute at hand. That is, when a given state's law applies
beyond its borders only because a sister state permits its law to have extraterritorial
effect, there may be fewer concerns about state overreaching. Note, however, that the
logic of Carrollwould have applied equally had a Mississippi court been hearing the
dispute, since the cause of action would still have arisen in Mississippi notwithstanding the extensive Alabama contacts of the disputants and the case. See id. at 804. The
vested rights theory thus had the effect of giving state courts, in appropriate circumstances, broad license to apply forum law to far-flung events.
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It thus may be potentially useful to distinguish between two types
of territorialism in talking about state power. On the one hand, there
is the form of territorialism that focuses on borders as formal markers
that promote predictability and certainty. This is the type of territorialism embodied in the vested rights approach; under such an
approach, it is generally clear (even if subject to potentially arbitrary
and easily manipulated factors) which jurisdiction has the authority to
pronounce on certain conduct. A second framework through which
to look at territorialism, however, focuses on states' substantive
authority to regulate extraterritorially. In thinking about territorialism, it is thus worth noting that the first view has a long history in
interstate choice-of-law thinking, while the second-while sometimes
paid lip service to-has had less effect in practice. As will be seen,
confusion of these two types of territorialism has sometimes resulted
in uncertainty about whether and how to limit the extraterritorial
83
application of state law by state courts.
c.

Choice of Law and the Constitution

Despite the diversity of choice-of-law approaches applied by state
courts-and the substantial shift in those approaches that has
occurred in the past half-century or so-the Supreme Court has only
rarely suggested that a state's choice-of-law decisions might be subject
84
to constitutional limits. In early cases like Home Insurance Co. v. Dick,
the Court indicated that modest bounds might exist under the Due
Process Clause on state courts' ability to impose forum law where a
state had few significant contacts with a dispute.8 5 Yet even in cases
(such as Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Commission8 6 and
Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission8 7 )
decided while the vested rights notion of state power still held sway,
the Court permitted state courts to apply forum law to out-of-state
events despite arguments that the Full Faith and Credit Clause88 (a
provision the Court found not to be at issue in Dick89 ) required appli83 See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
84 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
85 Id. at 402-05, 408 (holding that principles of due process precluded Texas
from applying its law to invalidate a clause in an insurance contract entered into in
Mexico and valid in Mexico, where the boat that was the subject of the underlying
insurance dispute had been destroyed in Mexico).
86 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
87 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
88 U.S. CONST. art. 1V, § 1.
89 See Dick, 281 U.S. at 410-11.
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cation of the law of some other state. 90 Indeed, these cases suggested,
so long as the state had some minimal interest in the dispute-in the
sense of "interest" as used by choice-of-law scholars like Currie-it
would always be constitutional for the state to apply forum law. 9 1
The Court established the modern framework for assessing constitutional limits on choice-of-law in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, in
which a plurality ofJustices permitted a Minnesota court to apply Minnesota law to a dispute over "stacking" of insurance coverage for an
accident. 92 Minnesota's connection to the case was tenuous: the
insurance policy at issue had been delivered in Wisconsin, the accident had occurred in Wisconsin, and all persons involved in the accident were Wisconsin residents when it occurred.9 3 All contacts with
Minnesota were incidental and unrelated to the subject matter of the
suit: the accident victim, Hague, worked in Minnesota; 94 Allstate did
business in Minnesota; 95 and Hague's widow (the plaintiff) had married a Minnesota resident and moved to Minnesota prior to filing the
lawsuit.9 6 Nonetheless, however, the Minnesota court reached its conclusion by relying on the work of choice-of-law theorist Robert A.
Leflar, 97 who advocated that courts choose the law that was "better," in
the sense of "mak[ing] good socio-economic sense for the time when
90 In Alaska Packers, the Court permitted California to award worker's compensation to an employee despite the fact that he had been injured in Alaska. See 294 U.S.
at 538-39. PacificEmployers reached a similar conclusion as to California courts' obli-

gation to apply Massachusetts law. See 306 U.S. at 504-05.
91 See Louise Weinberg, Choice of Law and Minimal Scrutiny, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 440,
448 (1982) (noting that, under Alaska Packers and Pacific Employers, "there are, in fact,
no limits whatsoever on the choice of an interested state's laws").
92 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 305, 320 (1981) (plurality opinion).
Specifically, the plaintiff, whose husband had been killed in a motorcycle accident,
sought a declaration that her late husband's insurance policies could be "stacked"
pursuant to Minnesota law. Id. at 305. Notably, the issue of whether policies could be
stacked under Minnesota law was a court formulated rule, although one based on an
interpretation of Minnesota statutes. See Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43, 49
(Minn. 1979); Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 207 N.W.2d 348, 350-52
(Minn. 1973).
93 Hague, 449 U.S. at 306 (plurality opinion).
94 Hague also commuted to work in Minnesota, although the accident had not
occurred during his commute. Id. at 314.
95 Id. at 317.
96 Id. at 318-19. While acknowledging that a post-accident move would be "insufficient in and of itself' as a basis for the application of a given state's law, the Court
nonetheless found that "such a change of residence was [not] irrelevant." Id. at 319
(citing John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936)).
97 See Hague, 289 N.W.2d at 46 n.4.
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the court speaks" 9 8-a metric that, the court found in this case,
pointed toward Minnesota law. 99
Noting that "[i] t is not for this Court to say whether... we would
make the same choice-of-law decision if sitting as the Minnesota
Supreme Court," the Court plurality nonetheless held that it would
not disturb a state court's choice of law provided it was "neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair."1 0 0 This test, the plurality indicated,
would be satisfied if the state whose law was applied had any "significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, with the parties
and the occurrence or transaction." 10 1 This set of standards was
rooted, the plurality found, in both the Due Process Clause and the
Full Faith and Credit Clause, but its essential requirements were the
10 2
same under both.
The standard set forth in Hague-especially as applied by the
Hague plurality-is hardly a rigorous one; indeed, it has been
described as marking " [t] he apparent end of all meaningful limits" on
state choice-of-law decisions. 10 3 In addition to its express suggestion
that, within very broad limits, choice of law was essentially a matter to
be left to state courts, the Hague test is also notable for collapsing to
some degree the boundaries between state adjudicative and legislative
jurisdiction. In other words, the Hague "aggregation of contacts" test
strongly resembles the basic test for contacts-based personal jurisdiction104: that the defendant have "certain minimum contacts [with the
98 Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-InfluencingConsiderations,54 CAL.
L. REv. 1584, 1588 (1966). Leflar in fact advocated consideration of several factors
(including predictability, maintenance of interstate order, simplification of the judicial task, and advancement of the forum's governmental interests) in addition to the
question of which law was "better," although he did acknowledge that the latter factor
was a "potent" one. Id. at 1586-88.
99 See Hague, 289 N.W.2d at 49.
100 Hague, 449 U.S. at 307-08 (plurality opinion).
101 Id. at 308.
102 See id. at 308 n.10. However, Justice Stevens, in concurrence, argued that the
Full Faith and Credit Clause spoke to a slightly different set of concerns. Under Stevens' formulation, the due process portion of the analysis asks whether the state in
question may apply forum law, while the full faith and credit portion asks whether it is
required to apply the law of some other state. See id. at 320 (Stevens, J., concurring).
In some ways, the standard Stevens advocates would incorporate a greater extraterritoriality focus into the Hague standard, since it would acknowledge that a state's decision to apply forum law potentially affects not only the rights of individuals but those
of other states.
103 Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and TerritorialStates: The Constitutional
Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 249, 257 (1992).
104 I am not the first to make this observation. SeeJuenger, supranote 5, at 1333.
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forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'tradi0 5
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'
The analysis of minimum contacts and the choice-of-law "aggregation of contacts" is likely to differ in only one context: class actions. In
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, even as a majority of the Court reaffirmed the Hague standard by endorsing the approach of the Hague
plurality, the Court suggested that, at least in certain circumstances,
Hague might pose meaningful limits on courts' choice-of-law discre10 6
tion beyond those placed by personal jurisdiction requirements.
Shutts involved claims by 28,100 class members entitled to royalties on
oil and gas leases who alleged that they were entitled to interest on
delayed payments. 10 7 The plaintiffs had apparently chosen Kansas
because of its favorable substantive law, and there were few actual contacts between the plaintiffs and Kansas. I0 8 Only a small fraction of the
class members lived in Kansas, the defendant was not headquartered
or incorporated there, and the large majority of the leases concerned
property outside the state. 0 9 Under such circumstances, the Court
found, the state court could not, consistent with the Due Process and
Full Faith and Credit clauses, apply Kansas law to all the leases." 0
The Court acknowledged that "[the defendant] owns property
and conducts substantial business in the State, so Kansas certainly has
an interest in regulating [its] conduct in Kansas." 1 ' Further, Kansas
had an interest in protecting the rights of the relatively small portion
of class members who were Kansas residents. 1 2 Nonetheless, these
contacts were insufficient to support the application of Kansas law to
13
the claims of plaintiffs unconnected to Kansas.'
Shutts, then, is notable for articulating the main distinction
between the minimum contacts test for personal jurisdiction and the
Hague choice-of-law formulation: the personal jurisdiction test applies
only to defendants (the Court rejected the suggestion that it lacked
personal jurisdiction over class members),' 1 4 while the choice-of-law
test is assessed by considering plaintiffs' contacts as well. 1 5 Shutts is
105 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
106 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821-22 (1985).
107 See id. at 799-801.
108 See id. at 820-21.
109 Id. at 799-801.
110 See id. at 821-22.
111 Id. at 819.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 821-22.
114 Id. at 814.
115 See id. at 812, 821-22.
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further significant for showing that, at least in the context of a class
action, the Court was willing to give the Hague test some bite. Finally,
Shutts suggests two bases on which to assess whether contacts are
meaningful: the expectation of the parties as to which state's law will
control their transaction, and the question of whether there is any
relationship between the suit and "'anything done or to be done
within"' the forum's borders. ' 1 6 The latter of these two factors bears
some relationship to an effects test of the sort applied in international
law.
In some ways, these were significant steps. Even if Shutts nominally reaffirms Hague's liberal approach to choice of law in individual
lawsuits, it minimized to some extent the Hague principle's implications. Shutts makes clear, for example, that the fact that a defendant
does business in a forum will not in itself support the application of
forum law where the plaintiff and the claim lack connection to the
forum.1

17

Further, Shutts' specific condemnation of the automatic

application of forum law to nationwide class actions' 18 served to limit
an important circumstance in which state law might otherwise have
significant extraterritorial reach. That is, since nationwide class
actions by definition involve many litigants and cross-territorial
boundaries, they are much more likely than individual suits to raise
concerns about the excessively broad application of a particular state's
law.
Shutts, however, represented an extreme case; the class members
at issue lived outside Kansas, had no property in Kansas, and apparently lacked any other contacts of note with Kansas.'1 9 Thus, Shutts
leaves open the possibility of applying forum law in a situation like
Hague, where the plaintiff has some contacts-however tangentialwith the forum. 120 For that reason, the significance of Shutts may be
12 1
limited outside the class action context.
Moreover, even if Shutts suggested a new willingness on the part
of the Court to invalidate the application of forum law in the absence
of meaningful contacts, the Court has failed to follow through on that
116 Id. at 822 (quoting Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 410 (1930)).
117 Id. at 814-15, 818-23.
118 See id. at 820-22.
119 See id. at 815.
120 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313-19 (1981) (plurality opinion).
121 Note that, in Shutts, all but two of the out-of-state plaintiffs were class members
who were simply passive participants in the lawsuit. 472 U.S. at 800-01. When a
plaintiff has an active role in choosing the forum in which to file and the causes of
action to assert, she is in a much better position to identify and highlight contacts
with the state that support the application of forum law.
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suggestion, particularly in individual lawsuits. Indeed, a curious coda
to Hague and Shutts, Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, forcefully reaffirmed the
principle that the Court would not disturb reasonable decisions by
state courts to apply forum law. The basic holding of Wortman was
simply a reiteration of the long standing principle that, even if a state
court lacks the power to apply its substantive law to disputes, forum
procedural law (such as a statute of limitations) still applies. 122 More
broadly, however, the Court announced that-because it had no
interest in "constitutionalizing choice-of-law rules"-matters such as
the characterization of a rule as substantive or procedural for choiceof-law purposes would normally be left to the states.1 23 Wortman,
indeed, suggests that the Constitution is indifferent to which state's
law is applied under most circumstances, suggesting that "the legislative jurisdictions of the States overlap" and that "frequently... a court
can lawfully apply either the law of one State or the contrary law of
124
another."
Wortman further (and more puzzlingly, given the many points of
disparity between interstate and international conflicts principles)
suggests that state courts' choice-of-law powers under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause are "interpreted against the background of principles developed in international conflicts law." 125 At least one scholar
has argued, therefore, that Wortman broadens the test articulated in
Hague,permitting the application of forum law in a way "supported by
principles of international law or historical application, .

.

. even if it

126
does not meet the Hague 'sufficient contacts' test."
Despite some incoherence and uncertainty about the precise
reach of the Hague standard, one can make two broad statements
about the Court's choice-of-law decisions as a whole. First, they permit state courts great latitude-especially in individual suits-to apply
their law to disputes over which they have jurisdiction. Second, they
generally have failed to grapple with the issue of extraterritoriality per
se-in other words, to treat choice of law as in part an issue of state
sovereignty as well as one of due process. Indeed, the Court's choiceof-law decisions resemble its personal jurisdiction ones not only in the
substantive content of the standard they establish, but in that stan-

122 Sun Oil Co.v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988).
123 Id. at 727-28. As the Court reasoned (referring to the long tradition of treating statutes of limitations as procedural), "long established and still subsisting choiceof-law practices that come to be thought, by modem scholars, unwise, do not thereby

become unconstitutional." Id. at 728-29.
124

Id. at 727.

125

Id. at 723.

126

Bradford, supra note 47, at 120-21.
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dard's animating concerns. In both settings, the Court has been primarily preoccupied with protecting litigants from unfair or unwanted
results and has given relatively little attention to questions of interstate
12 7
comity or horizontal federalism.
In the personal jurisdiction context, the Court's focus on due
process at the expense of federalism concerns has recently been both
criticized 128 and defended, 129 with some scholars arguing that the
Court should expand upon suggestions in cases like World-Wide Volkswagen that personal jurisdiction also has implications for the balance
of power among the various states. 130 For the moment, however, it is
important to note that the near-exclusive focus on due process in the
tests for both personal jurisdiction and choice of law means that no
real opportunity exists in any exercise of power by a state court-any
exercise, that is, of either its adjudicative or legislative jurisdiction-to
consider what effect it may have on broader concerns of interstate
relations. In other words, if one were to look only at Hague coupled
with the tests for personal jurisdiction, one might think that states
enjoy a virtually unlimited power to prescribe substantive standards
applicable to out-of-state conduct so long as that power is exercised in
a way that does not cause unfair surprise to individuals.
In some ways, of course, it seems unlikely that such a broad scope
for individual legislation by states could be workable, particularly
given the variety of choice-of-law regimes applied by the various
states.13 1 And, as I will subsequently describe, it is not the whole story.
The Court has frequently invoked a second extraterritoriality principle-possibly rooted in the dormant Commerce Clause, but possibly
127

See supra notes 84-105 and accompanying text.

128 See Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, Liberty, Substantive Due Process, and Personal
Jurisdiction, 82 TUL. L. REv. 567, 568-70 (2007) (describing-although arguing
against-the extensive body of scholarship rejecting due process as a basis for personal jurisdiction restrictions); James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of
JudicialJurisdiction: Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REv. 169, 172 (2004)
("[T]he basic territorial framework of the limitations on state court jurisdiction stems
not from the Due Process Clause, or any other provision protecting individuals from
untoward assertions of state power, but from federal common law rules developed
under the influence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to allocate judicial power
among the states." (footnote omitted)).
129 See, e.g., Rhodes, supra note 128, at 572-77.
130 See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 128, at 171-72, 264-70.
131 Note that the vested rights approach, when it was followed fairly universally by
all states, had the advantage of specifying only one state's law to govern a given dispute. In other words, if an accident occurred and caused injury in Mississippi, various
state courts would recognize that Mississippi law was appropriately applied to the
resulting dispute. See Scott Fruehwald, ConstitutionalConstraints on State Choice of Law,
24 U. DAYTON L. REv. 39, 42-44 (1998).
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also in broader structural principles of federalism-to invalidate state
legislation purporting to regulate out-of-state conduct. It is this principle I will describe in the following section.
2.

Restrictions on State Powers to Legislate

One might think, at least at first glance, that state courts' power
to apply forum law to out-of-state events would essentially define the
limits of state legislative jurisdiction. That is, to the extent that a state
statute purports to reach extraterritorial conduct, the courts of that
state are likely the primary, if not the sole, means of enforcing that
statute. Suppose, for example, that the State of California wishes to
adopt a statute imposing safety regulations on gun manufacturers
nationwide. It is clear that California lacks the power to coerce compliance with the statute in Nevada by, say, sending inspectors to
Nevada facilities who are empowered to levy fines for violations.
While other alternatives (such as conditioning state benefits on compliance with the statute's requirements, for example) might suggest
themselves, the most straightforward way of ensuring compliance with
the statute is likely to be to allow litigants to enforce it in California
courts-either by seeking an injunction or by asserting that violation
of the statute forms an element in a case for liability. 132 While these
two situations pose somewhat different issues, the extent to which California courts can apply California law to the dispute might appear to
be the primary issue in both. 133
Nonetheless, courts have generally addressed the question of the
permissible extraterritorial reach of a state's laws through a separate
line of cases from those establishing the extent of a state's ability to
apply forum law to out-of-state disputes. For this reason, the canoni132 1 set aside as somewhat beyond the scope of this Article a final possibility-that
the state itself could bring a criminal or civil enforcement proceeding in California
court against an out-of-state entity. It is not in fact clear that such an action would be
analyzed, under many choice-of-law theories, in dramatically different terms from private litigation. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 23, at 628-29 (suggesting that the basic
framework for assessing the constitutionality of states' choice of law also applies to the
criminal context). Nonetheless, because the criminal context may raise special issues
of federalism and individual rights, I confine my analysis to civil litigation. Further, in
practical terms, it is unlikely to be feasible for states to enforce compliance with regulatory statutes through official proceedings in most-or even many-cases.
133 Plaintiffs might, of course, also seek relief in Nevada courts or Wyoming courts
or Massachusetts courts, for that matter, assuming appropriate jurisdictional requirements were met. While it seems unlikely, as a practical matter, that foreign state
courts would be likely to give another state's law broad extraterritorial application,
any principle governing state courts' choice-of-law decisions should of course encompass such a possibility.
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cal scholarly treatment of legislative extraterritoriality deliberately
134
ignores traditional conflicts analysis.
Like its relationship to choice-of-law restrictions, the exact constitutional source of the extraterritoriality principle is something of a
mystery. In general, the Supreme Court's counsel on this subject has
been expressed not in terms of clear prohibitions but rather "consistent undercurrent[s] contained within several sets of doctrines" that
"[t] aken together ...produce a line of thought limiting the extraterritorial power of the states.' 1 35 These "undercurrents" arise from sev-

eral different constitutional provisions. Thus, "[n]o one is quite
certain what part of the Constitution should be regarded as imposing
restrictions on a state's jurisdiction to prescribe its law to extraterrito1 36
rial conduct."
An initial question worth considering is what precisely such an
extraterritoriality principle might add to the Hague line of cases,
which presumably provides a basis for objecting to unfair or arbitrary
137
application of forum law by state courts to out-of-state conduct.
That is, given that Hague appears to impose a limit on extraterritorial
application of state law, why should we need a second standard, and
what justification is there for having one? It is this problem that I will
consider in depth in the final part of this Article. For the moment,
however, it is worth noting that there are at least two situations (one
of which I have already alluded to briefly) in which an extraterritoriality principle might not be redundant. First, there is the situation
where a state uses some nonjudicial means of enforcing such a regulation by attempting to condition some benefit-such as the right to do
business in a state-on an entity's compliance with the state's efforts
to regulate its out-of-state conduct. Second, there is the idea that,
under some circumstances, a litigant may wish to challenge the validity of the underlying legislation as applied to out-of-state conduct
rather than the propriety of a court's particular decision to apply forum
law to an individual case. It is perhaps questionable whether the sub134 See Regan, supra note 10, at 1885 ("[T]he cases I am interested in are quite
unlike the standard fare of conflicts analysis."). Regan, however, also argues that conflicts scholarship could benefit from greater attention to the extraterritoriality principle he discusses. See id. at 1886.
135 Welkowitz, supra note 11, at 23.
136 Rostron, supra note 1, at 122.
137 It is fairly obvious, for example, that the net effect of the Court's decision in
Hague was to permit Minnesota to apply its law to Wisconsin conduct. See Welkowitz,
supra note 11, at 49-50 (noting that in allowing "a Minnesota court to apply Minnesota law to an insurance coverage issue relating to a car accident that occurred
outside the state and that involved no Minnesota residents," the Supreme Court permitted Minnesota to give its law extraterritorial effect).
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stantive standard applied to assess the state's regulatory power should
be different from the Hague standard in either of these two instances.
But, at least theoretically, neither of these situations is strictly a question of the choice of law made by a court. Thus, it is possible to see
why a separate line of cases might have evolved to govern these particular circumstances-even if the lines of demarcation between states'
exercise of legislative jurisdiction by, on the one hand, the enactment
of a statute and, on the other, the application of state law in state
13 8
courts, are not particularly clear.
a.

Legislative Jurisdiction and the Edgar Extraterritoriality
Principle

In a series of cases in the 1980s, the Supreme Court articulated a
strong-if not entirely clear-prohibition on extraterritoriality under
the rubric of the dormant Commerce Clause. Nonetheless, it has
done so in a line of cases that appears quite separate-doctrinally and
conceptually-from garden-variety dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, and that (as some have argued) is better understood as
reflecting broader concerns of structural federalism rather than specific issues of interstate commerce.
In general, conventional dormant Commerce Clause analysis has
nothing to do with extraterritorial effects per se. 1 39 Normally, facially
neutral state regulation that has an impact on interstate commerce is
subject only to the balancing test of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,'140 which

asks whether the statute in question "regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest" and whether "its effects on
interstate commerce are only incidental"; 41 if so, the statute does not
pose a constitutional problem "unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local bene138 The extent to which issues of legislative extraterritoriality arise is limited by the
common assumption that state statutes are intended to apply only within state borders. See Regan, supranote 10, at 1886. Nonetheless, state legislatures with reasonable frequency indicate that they wish their laws to have some sort of extraterritorial
effect, or at least to "hover around the borderline of the prohibition on extraterritoriality." Id.
139 Scholars have frequently argued that the primary function of dormant Commerce Clause cases is and should be to smoke out state protectionism. See, e.g., Earl
M. Maltz, How Much Regulation Is Too Much-An Examination of Commerce ClauseJurisprudence, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 47, 50 (1981); Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court
and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV.
1091, 1095 (1986).
140 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
141 Id. at 142.
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fits." 142 State regulation that appears facially discriminatory against

1 43
out-of-state commerce is subject to strict scrutiny.
While the Court had earlier suggested that dormant Commerce
Clause analysis might be intertwined with more general concerns
about extraterritoriality,14 4 the Court substantially broadened and
expanded upon those concerns in a series of cases decided the 1980s,
beginning with Edgar v. MITE Corp.145 Edgar concerned an Illinois
statute authorizing the Secretary of State to hold a fairness hearing
about-and, potentially, to deny registration to-a tender offer targeting a corporation that had its principal office in Illinois, was organized
under Illinois law, or had at least ten percent of its stated capital in the
state. 14 6 The Court affirmed a lower court decision finding that the
1 47
statute was inconsistent with the Commerce Clause.
A plurality of the Court rested its conclusion on the idea that the
dormant Commerce Clause balancing test permitted only "incidental"
regulation of interstate commerce, and the Illinois statute "directly
regulate [d] transactions which take place across state lines, even if
wholly outside the State of Illinois."1 48 As the Court noted, "if Illinois
may impose such regulations, so may other States; and interstate commerce in securities transactions generated by tender offers would be

thoroughly stifled. 1 1 49

In reaching this conclusion, the plurality

articulated a wide-ranging prohibition on extraterritorial regulation,
finding that the Commerce Clause "precludes the application of a
State's
state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the
50
borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within the State.'
The Court subsequently applied and extended Edgar's test in several additional cases. In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,15 1 the
Court-even while upholding against a Commerce Clause challenge
142
143
144
145

Id.
See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986).
See, e.g.,
S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 773 (1945).
457 U.S. 624 (1982).

Id. at 626-27.
Id. at 643-46. While only a plurality of the Court found that the Illinois statute
violated an extraterritoriality principle, id. at 641-42 (plurality opinion), a majority
agreed that the statute failed the Pike balancing test, see id. at 643 (majority opinion).
146
147

Majorities of the Court in later cases adopted the key features ofJustice White's extraterritoriality analysis in Edgar. See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 335-37 (1989);

Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 582-84
(1986).

148

Edgar, 457 U.S. at 641 (plurality opinion).

149 Id. at 642.
150 Id. at 642-43 (emphasis added).
151 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
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an Indiana anti-takeover statute narrower than the one at issue in
Edgar-held that a proper Commerce Clause inquiry also includes
scrutiny of whether the statute at issue "may adversely affect interstate
commerce by subjecting activities to inconsistent regulations."' 15 2 As
will be discussed shortly, many commentators have seen CTS as establishing an additional "inconsistent regulations" prong of dormant
Commerce Clause analysis, in addition to more straightforward extraterritoriality concerns. In two later cases- Brown-FormanDistillers Corp.
v. New York State Liquor Authority153 and Healy v. Beer Institute154-the
Court cited Edgar in invalidating two "price affirmation" statutes
requiring liquor sellers, prior to doing business in the state (New York
and Connecticut, respectively), to file a schedule of prices and affirm
that they were not offering lower prices elsewhere. 15 5 In both cases,
the Court focused on the extraterritorial effects of the statute. In
Brown-Forman, the Court reasoned: "Once a distiller has posted prices
in New York, it is not free to change its prices elsewhere in the United
States during the relevant month. Forcing a merchant to seek regulatory approval in one State before undertaking a transaction in
another directly regulates interstate commerce.' 56 Likewise, in Healy,
the Court disregarded small differences between the Connecticut statute and the one at issue in Brown-Forman 57 to conclude that the statute "has the undeniable effect of controlling commercial activity
58
occurring wholly outside the boundary of the State."'
In Healy, the Court (in dicta) also articulated perhaps its most farreaching set of restrictions on legislation affecting out-of-state behavior. In attempting to summarize existing extraterritoriality/dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Court suggested that legislation
might be unconstitutionally extraterritorial if it applies "'to commerce
152 Id. at 88; see also Regan, supra note 10, at 1869 (criticizing the CTS Court's
treatment of extraterritoriality as a Commerce Clause issue).
153 476 U.S. 573 (1986).
154 491 U.S. 324 (1989).
155 In Brown-Forman, the price affirmation law included all liquor sellers and covered the entire United States. 476 U.S. at 576. In Healy, it was limited to beer sellers
and bordering states. 491 U.S. at 326-27. Further, after an earlier version was struck
down, the Connecticut legislature amended the law to permit sellers to change their
out-of-state prices after posting the affirmation. See id. at 328-29. A related statute,
however, prohibited shippers from selling beer in Connecticut at higher prices in any
given month than were offered in bordering states. See id.
156 Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 582 (footnote omitted).
157 See supra note 155 (describing differences). The Court found the Healy statute
"essentially indistinguishable" from the one at issue in Brown-Forman. Healy, 491 U.S.
at 339.
158 Healy, 491 U.S. at 337.
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that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders, whether or not
the commerce has effects within the State,' ''1 59 if its "practical
1 60
effect.., is to control conduct beyond the boundaries of the State,"
or if it would create a problem with "inconsistent legislation arising
from the projection of one state regulatory regime into the jurisdic16 1
tion of another State."
The Court set forth two bases for these restrictions. First, in suggesting that the statute at issue "has the practical effect of controlling
Massachusetts prices," the Court suggested that there was something
improper about extraterritorial regulation per se-in other words,
with any attempt by a state to control out-of-state conduct, regardless
162
of the state's intent or the effects of such conduct within the state.
Second, the Court echoed the concern raised in CTS about haphazard and inconsistent regulation, noting that the "effect of this affirmation law, in conjunction with the many other beer-pricing and
affirmation laws that have been or might be enacted throughout the
country, is to create just the kind of competing and interlocking local
economic regulation that the Commerce Clause was meant to
63
preclude."'
These two concerns articulated by the Court in Healy are sometimes thought to embody two separate sets of potential restrictions on
state legislation-one prohibiting extraterritorial regulation per se
(the restriction on regulation of commerce "wholly outside of the
State's borders") and one prohibiting state regulation when it is likely
to create a patchwork of inconsistent regulations. I 64 The first of these
principles appears straightforward enough-it is presumably fairly
easy, at least as a theoretical matter, to determine whether a particular
form of commerce is occurring in state or out of state. But the exact
scope of this principle is unclear. As we have seen, the imposition of
tort liability in a given state-especially under traditionally territorial
choice-of-law rules-may have the effect of implicitly creating a standard of conduct for wholly out-of-state behavior, but the Edgar line of
159 Id. at 336 (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642-43 (1982) (plurality opinion)).
160 Id.
161 Id. at 337.
162 Id. at 338.
163 Id. at 337.
164 SeeJack L. Goldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 806 (2001). Note that the concern here is not that defendants may be subjected to directly conflicting obligations (for example, being required
to perform an act in one jurisdiction that is illegal in another) but that enterprises
that operate nationally may find it burdensome to comply with a variety of local regulations. See id. at 806-07.
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cases-while not explicitly limiting their holdings to legislation 16 5gives no sign that the Court foresaw or intended a sweeping invalidation of such rules. Nonetheless, state courts have sometimes differentiated between statutory and common law (or, in some cases, between
regulatory prohibitions and tort liability) in their extraterritoriality
analysis.

166

The second principle-the apparent prohibition on inconsistent
regulation-is potentially even more problematic. It is obviously
inherent in the nature of a federalist system that some differenceseven substantial differences-exist in the way particular states regulate
the same activity. While suggesting that a high degree of inconsistency, particularly one that appreciably burdens firms that operate in
many states, raises constitutional problems, the Supreme Court has
not been particularly clear about what degree of inconsistency is
required.1 6 7 Further, the Court has left ambiguous the relationship
between concerns about inconsistent regulation and extraterritoriality
more generally. The inconsistent regulations test, on its face, embodies concerns about "undermin[ing] a compelling need for national
uniformity in regulation"-concerns that seem more about vertical
federalism vis-A-vis the federal government than issues of the balance
165 Cf Harold W. Horowitz, The Commerce Clause as a Limitation on State Choice-off
Law Doctrine, 84 HARv.L. REV.806, 813-21 (1971) (arguing-before the Court's decision in Edgar-that the Commerce Clause should apply to states' choice-of-law
decisions).
166 In City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 12 Mass. L. Rptr. 225 (Super. Ct.
2000), the court noted that established case law dealing with the extraterritoriality
prong of the Commerce Clause "focus[es] on positive law-statutes or regulations,"
id. at 233, and that this line of cases' applicability to common law tort and contract
causes of action was "unsettled," id. As a result, the court refused to grant a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim of nuisance, negligence, failure to warn, and other
common law actions against gun manufacturers. Id. at 234-37. While suggesting that
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Goremight possibly establish an extraterritoriality principle relevant to state common law claims, the court regarded this principle as relevant
primarily to the remedy imposed, not to the failure to state a claim in the first
instance. See City of Boston, 12 Mass. L. Rptr. at 233-34. In Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 89
Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Ct. App. 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001), a
California appellate court rejected an argument that the imposition of a common law
duty of care on gun manufacturers would constitute extraterritorial regulation. Id. at
178 & n.21. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs were seeking only damages for past
conduct, not an injunction for future conduct; further, the court distinguished tort
liability from the "state regulatory or penal statutes" at issue in cases like Edgar. Id. at
178-79 & n.21. Notably, the relevant distinction for the Merrill court was between
regulatory law and tort law, not statutory law and common law. Id.
167 See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 164, at 789 (describing the inconsistent regulations prong as "unsettled and poorly understood").
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of power among states. 168 Yet, as Donald Regan has noted, the problem of inconsistent regulations is inextricably linked with that of extraterritoriality, since "if every legally regulable event or state-of-affairs
could be unambiguously assigned to a unique territorial jurisdiction,
then a prohibition on extraterritorial legislation would make inconsistent regulations ... impossible."1 69 In other words, regulatory inconsistency across borders makes regulation of out-of-state events more
problematic; analyses of these two issues are thus difficult to
170
separate.
In part because the Edgarline of cases represents a shift in focus
from ordinary dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, some scholars have argued that they should be properly understood as rooted
not specifically in the Commerce Clause but in broader structural
notions of federalism implicit in the Constitution, or perhaps in the
very notion of what state power might mean. 17 1 Donald Regan has
argued that the Commerce Clause provides an inadequate basis for
understanding the extraterritoriality principle because some state regulation that we would clearly condemn as extraterritorial has nothing
to do with commerce.17 2 Writing in the Bowers v. Hardwick7 3 era,
Regan gives the example of homosexual conduct that is legal in some
states but not others; assuming Georgia prohibits such conduct, Georgia cannot punish an Illinois citizen who happens to be traveling
through the state for a prior homosexual act that took place within his
home state of Illinois. 174 Thus, Regan argues, the principle is rooted
not in a specific constitutional provision but in a "structural inference
from our system as a whole. ' 175

The Supreme Court has provided

168 Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298 n.12 (1997).
169 Regan, supra note 10, at 1875 ("[O]ne way to attack inconsistency is by a prohibition on extraterritoriality, and one reason to prohibit extraterritoriality is to avoid
inconsistency.").
170 Interestingly, issues of the interplay between individual state interests and
national effects may arise in the choice-of-law context as well. Some scholars have, for
example, made an interesting argument that choice-of-law rules-whether based on
law of the place of injury or interest analysis-provide an incentive for states to pass
pro-plaintiff legislation, since to do so means their residents will be able to recover in
state court, while the costs of compliance with more stringent standards are borne by
out-of-state manufacturers. See Bruce L. Hay, Conflicts of Law and State Competition in
the Product Liability System, 80 GEO. LJ. 617, 618-19 (1992).
171 See Regan, supra note 10, at 1885 (arguing that the extraterritoriality principle
is one of the "foundational principles of our federalism which we infer from the structure of the Constitution as a whole").
172 See id. at 1888.
173 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
174 See Regan, supra note 10, at 1888.
175 Id. at 1895.
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some grounds for such speculation by citing Edgar and Healy as support for a more general prohibition on state regulatory activity that
fails to "respect the interests of other States. ' 176 Therefore, it is arguable that the Edgar line of cases does more than simply provide a supplement to the Hague standard where commercial regulation is at
stake; instead, it articulates a competing vision of extraterritoriality.
b.

State Borders and the Nature of the Edgar Standard

The extraterritoriality prohibition articulated in Edgarand Healy
is so sweeping that most commentators have assumed that these cases
cannot mean what they appear to say. 1 77 As Gillian Metzger has
noted, "[ijn practice, states exert regulatory control over each other
all the time.' 178 The corporate law of Delaware, for example, has "de
facto nationwide application due to the number of major companies
incorporated there."1

79

Some scholars have thus attempted to make

sense of Edgar, Brown-Forman, and Healy by proposing a narrower,
more plausible reading of the principles for which these cases stand.
Jack Goldsmith and Alan Sykes argue that these cases are best understood as reflecting a principle of proportionality, as articulating the
view that states "may not impose burdens on out-of-state actors that
outweigh the in-state benefits."1 80 Donald Regan argues, somewhat
more elaborately, that while prospective price affirmation laws like
those at issue in Brown-Forman raise extraterritoriality issues, retroactive laws are of concern only if they have a protectionist motive. 18 '
Even taking such a narrowed view, however, the Edgar line of
cases presents a strikingly different set of concerns about extraterritoriality than those that courts generally consider in either the domestic
176 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 571 (1996).
177 See, e.g., Goldsmith & Sykes, supranote 164, at 806 (suggesting that the Court's
"overbroad extraterritoriality dicta" can be ignored).
178 Gillian E. Metzger, Congress,Article IV, and InterstateRelations, 120 HARv. L. REV.
1468, 1521 (2007).
179 Id.
180 Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 164, at 804.
181 See Regan, supra note 10, at 1903-05. A prospective affirmation law requires a
seller to affirm in advance that he will not sell the product out-of-state for a price
lower than that reflected on the filed in-state schedule. Id. at 1903. A retrospective
affirmation law simply requires the seller to affirm that she has not, during a previous
month, charged less in another state than she intends to charge in-state. Id. at 1905.
Regan was writing before the Healy decision, in which the Court announced that retrospective price affirmation statutes were also unconstitutionally extraterritorial. See
Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 342-43 (1989). The statute at issue in Healy itself
was "neither prospective nor retrospective, but rather 'contemporaneous.'" Id. at
335.
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choice-of-law context or in the international notions of legislative
jurisdiction. The Edgar cases, for example, are unconcerned with the
number or nature of contacts between the legislating state and the
targeted out-of-state activity, and they do not ask whether the out-ofstate activity being regulated causes harm within the state. Indeed,
Edgar announces that the Commerce Clause "precludes the application of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of
the State's borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within
182
the State."
As a result, these cases are in some tension with the ideas of territorial state power that undergird conflicts theory. As the previous section has discussed, all choice-of-law theories provide some basis for the
application of state law to commerce "wholly outside of the state's borders.

' 18 3

Indeed, because early, "territorial" choice-of-law theories

favored the law of the jurisdiction where the last event creating a
cause of action had occurred-regardless of the location of relevant
conduct-they almost inevitably resulted in the application of state
law to extraterritorial conduct that had little connection to the forum.
Interest analysis and other modern theories, while resting less on formalism, also frequently find that application of forum law is appropriate when the forum has an interest in the dispute, as when the welfare
of one of its domiciliaries is at stake.
Thus, the choice-of-law and the legislative extraterritoriality cases
appear to be motivated by somewhat different concerns. The legislative extraterritoriality cases appear to be rooted in a belief-whether
grounded in the Commerce Clause or in larger principles of federalism-that states should be limited in the extent to which they can
exert disproportionate influence over activities that fall within the
proper regulatory province of other states. Such cases further call
attention to the practical dangers of permitting competing states to
exert control over the same activities. This concern finds expression
most clearly in the line of cases dealing with inconsistent regulations.
But it also-as Regan has argued-forms a part of the more straightforward prohibition on extraterritoriality, since delineating a proper
scope of concern for state regulation avoids inconsistency and conflict
84

among multiple jurisdictions.1

By contrast, the Court's choice-of-law cases explicitly accept that
more than one state can apply its law to a given cause of actiondespite the fact that, when states apply their own law to events occur182
183
184

Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642-43 (1982) (plurality opinion).
See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
See Regan, supra note 10, at 1875.
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ring out of state, they are clearly exercising control over conduct that
another jurisdiction at least arguably has a concurrent right to regulate. This is particularly true given that states vary in the choice-of-law
regimes they apply; thus, a given transaction may potentially be governed by the laws of a number of different states depending on the
courts that ultimately hear it. Some choice-of-law theories-particularly those based on first Restatement/vested rights models-do place
weight in a different sense on principles of predictability and interstate harmony.1 8 5 Under the vested rights view, for example, it was
clear that if a tort victim was injured in New York then only New York
would have the right to apply its law, theoretically eliminating the pos18 6
sibility of friction with other states over whose law should govern.
Further, even today, the modest constitutional limits imposed by the
Supreme Court have sought to foster predictability in the sense that
parties should not be unfairly surprised by the law that is applied to
their disputes.18 7 To say that state law may be applied only when its
application is somewhat foreseeable, however, is very different from
saying that states may not regulate conduct at all outside their borders. The first principle is primarily about predictability and fairness;
the second, though it may have the side effect of fostering predictability, is primarily about extraterritoriality per se.
Edgar,Brown-Forman,and Healy thus all embody a "pure" strain of
territorial concern that sees state authority as primarily existing within
state borders. This concern finds little expression in cases that deal
with state choice of law, and the two lines of cases are thus in many
respects hard to reconcile.
II.

INFLUENCE AND OVERLAP

Because of the various ambiguities and inconsistencies of
Supreme Court doctrine, it may be useful to try to simply construct a
descriptive account of what the Supreme Court has said about the
extraterritoriality problem in choice of law and legislation. That
account might go as follows: Minimal constraints exist on a state
court's decision to apply forum law to a particular case and a particular individual.1 88 Whatever limits exist are, like personal jurisdiction
limits, grounded in the Due Process Clause (and, nominally, the Full
Faith and Credit Clause as well). Further, the test for assessing the
propriety of choice-of-law decisions outside the class action context is
185
186
187
188

See, e.g., Paul v. Nat'l Life, 352 S.E.2d 550, 555-56 (W. Va. 1986).
See id. at 556 n.14; supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985).
See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
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similar to that for establishing the existence of personal jurisdiction
under the "minimum contacts" test-perhaps appropriately so,
because both tests center on the issue of fairness to individual plaintiffs, not broader structural concerns.
By contrast, limits on the extraterritorial reach of state legislation
are somewhat more stringent, if also more ambiguous.18 9 The extraterritoriality principle purportedly derives from the dormant Commerce Clause and certainly applies at a minimum to invalidate some
commercial legislation that purports to regulate out-of-state conduct.
But it is perhaps best understood as a means of establishing orderand confining each state to its proper sphere of authority-in a federalist system. It is also worth noting that, in formal terms, an attack on
the grounds discussed in Edgarmanifests itself as an objection to the
validity of a statute itself-and not merely to a court's decision to
apply the statute in the particular circumstances of a given case.
From the account I have provided thus far, this descriptioneven if perhaps less than satisfying-is roughly accurate. It nonetheless, however, provides a notably incomplete picture. In numerous
situations, courts have to some extent conflated these two principlesby relying on one line of cases in support of the other, by suggesting
that both are manifestations of a single extraterritoriality principle, or
by blurring the due process rationale of Haguewith the structural federalism rationales of Edgar and Healy. Despite the apparent separation of the two lines of cases, this conflation is also logical in some
ways, given the fact that the kind of state power that has triggered
concerns in the Edgar line of cases may also be exercised when state
courts apply state law. Notably, this blended approach is also more in
keeping with international law notions of legislative jurisdiction,
which generally do not distinguish between the application of forum
law by a nation's courts and attempts by its legislature to prescribe
standards applicable to conduct outside its borders.1 90
This Part thus considers four of the instances of conflation of
such extraterritoriality concerns: the Supreme Court's recent imposition of due process restrictions on punitive damages; concerns about
189 See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
190 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 401 (a) (1986) (stating
that the "jurisdiction to prescribe" is the state's power "to make its law applicable to
the activities, relations, or status of persons, or the interests of persons in things,
whether by legislation, by executive act or order, by administrative rule or regulation,
or by determination of a court"). Of course, there are also many reasons for distinguishing interstate notions of extraterritoriality from international ones; for example,
any restrictions the dormant Commerce Clause imposes are unique to the interstate
context.
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extraterritoriality in Internet regulation; questions about whether
state courts have the power to issue nationwide injunctions based on
state law; and the controversy over permitting parties more scope to
select the law to be applied to their contracts.
A.

The Punitive Damages Cases

The Supreme Court's recent reexaminations of states' power to
impose punitive damages- BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore and State
FarmMutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell-representone of the
more puzzling manifestations of the choice-of-law/extraterritoriality
difficulty. These cases both hold that state courts are limited in their
ability to impose punitive damages for out-of-state conduct, particularly conduct that was lawful where it occurred. 19 1 In reaching these
conclusions, the Court has combined analysis apparently rooted in the
Due Process Clause with a nod to much broader extraterritoriality
concerns.
In Gore, the Court set aside ajury's award of $2 million in punitive
damages against BMW, leveled because of BMW's companywide policy
1 92
of failing to disclose that its cars had been subject to minor repairs.
BMW argued that this award was unfair in part because its policy had
never been found unlawful in any jurisdiction at the time the action
was filed. 193 Gore's most important holding was that punitive damages
would be subject to a proportionality analysis under the Due Process
Clause under which they would be appropriate only to the extent to
which (1) the defendant's conduct was reprehensible, (2) the award
of punitive damages bore a "reasonable relationship" to compensatory
damages, and (3) similar civil and criminal penalties existed for comparable misconduct. 194 Before announcing this three-part test, however, the Court indicated that its consideration of the "legitimate
interests" punitive damages would be permitted to serve was in part
also grounded in concerns about extraterritoriality.195 As the Court
found, it "follows from .

.

. principles of state sovereignty and comity

that a State may not impose economic sanctions on violators of its laws
191 See infra notes 195-98, 203-06 and accompanying text.
192 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562-63, 585-86 (1996). Thejury's
original award of $4 million had been reduced by the Alabama Supreme Court. Id. at
567.
193 Id. at 565. Shortly thereafter, another Alabamajury also found BMW's nondisclosure of repainting to be fraudulent. Id.
194 See id. at 574-85.
195 See id. at 568-71 ("[W]hile we do not doubt that Congress has ample authority
to enact such a policy for the entire Nation, it is clear that no single State could do so,
or even impose its own policy choice on neighboring States." (footnote omitted)).
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with the intent of changing the tortfeasors' lawful conduct in other
States."'1 9 6 Specifically, Alabama could not "punish ... conduct that
was lawful where it occurred and that had no impact on Alabama or
its residents."' 19 7 The Court cited the Commerce Clause and the
"need to respect the interests of other States" in support of this
conclusion. 198
While extraterritoriality was not an explicit part of the test the
Court announced under the Due Process Clause, the Court made
clear that concepts of the limits of state power were, to some extent,
intertwined with the three-part analysis. The Court suggested, for
example, that the defendant's nondisclosure policy was less reprehensible because it appeared to be legal in the jurisdictions in which it
occurred. 199 Further, in discussing the appropriate purposes of punitive damages, the Court opined that "[w]hile each State has ample
power to protect its own consumers, none may use the punitive damages deterrent as a means of imposing its regulatory policies on the
entire Nation." 20 0 The Court thus suggested that structural federalism
concerns-as well as considerations of individual fairness-should
play some role in applying the three-part test.
In making this suggestion, the Gore Court further conflated statutory and common law in a way it had not done in either the Hague or
Edgarcases. In the course of announcing restrictions on states' ability
to punish lawful out-of-state conduct, the Court observed that "[s] tate
power may be exercised as much by a jury's application of a state rule
of law in a civil lawsuit as by a statute." 20 1 This statement calls into

question the notion that the Edgarline of cases applied specifically or
exclusively to legislation, and certainly suggests that limits on state
court power must go beyond the minimal constraints of Hague. The
Court's statement that courts may not impose sanctions with "the
intent of changing the tortfeasors' lawful conduct in other States" 20

2

is

also striking in this regard, because it suggests that damages, especially
punitive damages, have regulatory purposes-that is, that they are
designed to shape future conduct as well as to punish past conduct.
196
197
198

Id. at 572.
Id. at 573.
Id. at 571.

199 See id. at 578 ("[T]he record contains no evidence that BMW's decision to
follow a disclosure policy that coincided with the strictest extant state statute was sufficiently reprehensible to justify a $2 million award of punitive damages.").
200

Id. at 585.

201

Id. at 572 n.17.

202

Id. at 572 (emphasis added).
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In the follow-up case to Gore, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, the Supreme Court struck down another award of
punitive damages-this time against an insurer who had refused in
bad faith to settle a claim against its insured. 20 3 Again, the Court
applied

Gore's three-part test 20

4

while also making reference

to

extraterritoriality. 205

notions of
In particular, the Court found that
the Utah courts had erred in considering "the perceived deficiencies
of State Farm's operations throughout the country"-in other words,
its allegedly similar practices in other states-in determining the
20 6
degree to which its conduct was reprehensible.
Strikingly, the Court in Campbell phrased the prohibition on
extraterritoriality explicitly in terms of choice-of-law requirements.
After finding that Utah lacked a "legitimate concern" in imposing
punitive damages for out-of-state conduct, the Court went on to
observe, citing Shutts, that "[a] ny proper adjudication of conduct that
occurred outside Utah to other persons would require their inclusion,
and, to those parties, the Utah courts, in the usual case, would need to
apply the laws of their relevant jurisdiction." 20 7 In other words, the
Court suggested, any judicial pronouncement-even by Utah courtson non-Utah conduct required the consideration of non-Utah law.20 8

203 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419-20 (2003).
204 See id. at 418.
205 See id. at 421.
206 Id. at 420.
207 Id. at 421-22 (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821-22
(1985)).
208 This line of reasoning can perhaps be explained, in part, by the Court's
increasing tendency to analogize punitive damages to criminal sanctions. As the
Court explained in Campbell, punitive damages "serve the same purposes as criminal
penalties" but lack the protections of criminal trials, thus making it particularly
important that they not be administered in an "imprecise" or "arbitrary" manner. Id.
at 417. Thus, perhaps, in the Court's view, it is necessary for punitive damages to
conform somewhat more to the stricter limits of criminal laW. See Catherine M.
Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 431 (2003) (noting
that the core of the Court's concern appears to be procedural protections). As
Wayne Logan points out, however, principles of criminal punishment are in fact
somewhat broader than the Court suggested in Campbell, both permitting punishment
for extraterritorial acts designed to produce in-state effects and allowing consideration of prior extraterritorial bad acts. See Wayne A. Logan, Civil and CriminalRecidivists: Extraterritorialityin Tort and Crime, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1609, 1629-31 (2005)
(describing modern criminal law's trend of considering extraterritorial acts).
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Various commentators have noted that Campbell appears to
announce a new choice-of-law limitation, 20 9 though it does so in a particularly ambiguous and perhaps somewhat incoherent way. As one
scholar has noted, the Campbell Court appears to have conflated the
determination of liability in the first instance with the analysis of reprehensibility in awarding punitive damages, thus "elid[ing] the subtle
distinction drawn in Gore between 'punishing' extraterritorial misconduct (impermissible) and using it as an evidentiary basis to gauge reprehensibility in assessing damages (permissible). "210 Further, the
Court has created an apparent discrepancy between awards of punitive damages and awards of compensatory damages in, for example,
class actions, which continued to be governed by the rather modest
2 11
limits of Shutts.

Gore and Campbell thus suggest that the Supreme Court may be
interested in synthesizing the Hague and Edgarlines of cases-or even
in articulating yet a third set of concerns about extraterritoriality.
Indeed, one of the striking features of the extraterritoriality analysis in
these two cases is that it sounds themes not found in either choice-oflaw or dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. Gore, for example, speaks
of Alabama's lack of power to punish conduct "that had no impact on
Alabama or its residents"-suggesting, as Hague and Edgar do not,
that a key feature of the states' power to regulate conduct may be the
extent to which such conduct has in-state effects. 2 12 Gore is also at

odds with the Court's various assertions in choice-of-law cases that
conduct may properly be governed by the law of more than one jurisdiction. Instead, the Gore Court indicates, conduct is either "lawful"
or "unlawful" where it occurred 213-suggesting, in other words, the
209

See Logan, supra note 208, at 1628 ("To the State Farm majority, the considera-

tion of extraterritorial misconduct amounted to a choice of law question."); Sharkey,
supra note 208, at 431 (commenting on Court's apparent choice-of-law framework).

210 Logan, supranote 208, at 1628. In a more recent pronouncement on the Due
Process Clause and punitive damages, the Court clarified this issue somewhat, noting

that the Due Process Clause does not "permit[] ajury to base that award in part upon
its desire to punish the defendant for harming persons who are not before the court
(e.g., victims whom the parties do not represent)," Phillip Morris USA v. Williams, 127
S. Ct. 1057, 1060 (2007), but that conduct to nonparties can be relevant to establish
reprehensibility. Id. at 1065.
211 See Logan, supra note 208, at 1628-29; Sharkey, supra note 208, at 429-32.
212 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 573 (1996); see also id. at 574
(noting that the punitive damages award must be based on "interests of Alabama consumers, rather than those of the entire Nation"). For a more complete discussion of
legislative jurisdiction based on effects, see infra Part III.C.
213 See Gore, 517 U.S. at 573.
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jurisdiction where the conduct physically took place has the power to
determine in the first instance whether it is proper or not.
A number of litigants have seized on these inconsistencies and
ambiguities to test the outer limits of the extraterritoriality doctrine.
For example, in District of Columbia v. Beretta, U.S.A., Corp.,2 14 plaintiffs
sued gun manufacturers under a provision of the D.C. Code establishing strict liability for manufacturers of machine guns or assault weapons "for all direct and consequential damages that arise from bodily
injury or death . . . result[ing] from the discharge of the assault
weapon or machine gun in the District of Columbia."2 1 5 The defend-

ants challenged this statute on both due process and Commerce
Clause grounds, arguing that the imposition of strict liability for lawful
out-of-state manufacture of firearms both "impermissibly burdens the
lawful interstate commerce of firearms and 'arbitrarily' attempts to
impose a regulatory scheme beyond the boundaries of the jurisdiction
enacting it. '216 The court rejected the Commerce Clause-based
extraterritoriality challenge on the grounds that, unlike the regulations at issue in cases like Brown-Forman, the strict liability statute was
not a direct attempt to affect out-of-state pricing of firearms, even if it
might "conceivably affect the defendants' pricing or insurance
' 2 17

decisions."

The defendants' more innovative-and troubling-argument,
based on Gore and Campbell, was that the strict liability statute constituted an "attempt by the District to impose its own policy choices as to
gun regulation on other states where the manufacture of machine
guns is lawful, thereby violating due process." 218 The court dismissed
this argument as well, but its brief, conclusory reasoning is less than
fully satisfying. First, the court said, punitive damages and compensation are different: "One looks in vain in either Gore or State Farmfor a
suggestion that a state may not permissibly decide that certain products ... are so dangerous that their manufacturers should face strict
liability... for injuries the products contribute to within the State."2 1 9 Sec-

ond, according to the court, the Supreme Court in the punitive damages cases acknowledged that "'[1] awful out-of-state conduct may be
probative' if it has 'a nexus to the specific harm suffered by the plain214 872 A.2d 633 (D.C. 2005).
215 D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-2551.02 (LexisNexis 2008).
216 Beretta, 872 A.2d at 655.
217 Id. at 657. The court also rejected a more conventional Commerce Clause
argument based on Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. Beretta, 872 A.2d at 657-58.
218 Beretta, 872 A.2d at 659.
219 Id. (emphasis added).
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2 20

Thus, because the District was only attempting to punish conduct that had an impact within its borders, the statute did not raise
22 1
due process concerns.
On the one hand, the court's conclusion is amply supported by
the Hague formulation and by doctrine and tradition in both the
interstate and international contexts. It is widely accepted as a matter
of international law that a jurisdiction may regulate conduct causing
harmful effects within its territory; 222 further, a nexus between such
conduct and harm within the jurisdiction would seem to easily satisfy
the "contacts" requirement of Hague. On the other hand, the D.C.
Court of Appeals' attempt to narrowly cabin the significance of Gore
and Campbell is not necessarily consistent with the Supreme Court's
actual reasoning in those cases. While it is true that the Court in those
cases gave no indication that their holdings might apply outside the
punitive damages context, it is hard to see what the basis for such a
limitation might be. In general, the power of states to impose criminal sanctions on extraterritorial conduct is probably no narrower-it
may, if anything, be broader-than their power to make such conduct
the basis for civil compensatory damages in their courts. 223 Further,
although the Supreme Court has sought to distinguish punitive and
compensatory damages, some of its distinctions may be difficult to
maintain. In Campbell, for example, the Court reasoned that compensatory damages are intended only to "'redress the concrete loss that
tiff. "'

220 Id. (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422
(2003) (alteration in original)).
221 Id.
222 See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909,
922 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("It has long been settled law that a country can regulate conduct occurring outside its territory which causes harmful results within its territory.").
Causing harm within the jurisdiction is also an established basis for permitting state
criminal prosecution of extraterritorial conduct. See, e.g., Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S.
280, 285 (1911) ("Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm
as if he had been present at the effect, if the State should succeed in getting him
within its power."); Bradford, supra note 47, at 98-99 (considering the assertion that a
state has jurisdiction to regulate abortion under "protective theory" because fetuses
"reside[]" within the prosecuting state and injury to them has effects in the state
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
223 In many scholars' view, for example, states clearly have the power to punish
criminally acts of state citizens performed in a different state. See Fallon, supra note
23, at 627-32 & n.82 (discussing the possibility of enforcing state abortion laws against
citizens of other states and concluding that the question would be "difficult" for the
Supreme Court); see also Bradford, supra note 47, at 127-36 (considering the same
question and finding that recent Supreme Court cases potentially support extraterritorial extension of state criminal law).
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the plaintiff has suffered,"' not deter future violations. 22 4 Yet many
commentators have argued that compensatory damages serve the
function of deterrence as well as compensation, 225 and the Court's
indications that a state may not attempt to "deter conduct that is lawful in other jurisdictions" 2 26 may thus have relevance for compensatory awards as well.
It seems clear from the Beretta litigation-and other cases in
which litigants have raised Gore issues in cases involving nonpunitive
remedies 2 27-that, at the very least, Gore and Campbell leave ambiguous the degree to which courts awarding damages based on out-ofstate conduct should be guided by concerns about territorial limits on
state power. But simply by indicating that concerns about extraterritoriality do not end when state power is being exercised by a court
awarding damages, the punitive damages cases suggest that the Hague
framework is inadequate to understand the sort of issues that are at
stake when state courts assess damages for out-of-forum conduct.
224 Campbell, 538 U.S. at 416 (quoting Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool
Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001)).
225 See, e.g.,
F. Patrick Hubbard, Substantive Due Process Limits on Punitive Damages
Awards: "Morals Without Technique"?, 60 FLA. L. REV. 349, 375 (2008) ("U]udicial
enforcement of private rights through compensatory damages awards in the tort system has become an important part of deterring wrongful conduct .....
226 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 573 (1996).
227 In a more nuanced discussion in Yu v. Signet Bank/Virginia, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d
304 (Ct. App. 1999), a California court attempted to apply the Gore due process standard to causes of action involving only compensatory damages. The Yus, California
residents, brought a class action against their Virginia-based credit card issuers and
stated claims for so-called "distant forum abuse" based on the defendants' practices of
seeking default judgments for unpaid debts in Virginia state court in a manner inconsistent with California debt-collection and consumer-protection statutes. Id. at 308.
The defendants argued that to permit the plaintiffs' claims for abuse of process and
unfair business practices would constitute extraterritorial regulation of practices allegedly legal in Virginia. Id. at 313. Relying on Gore, the court held that California
could, consistent with the Due Process Clause, prohibit consumer practices that
affected California residents. Id. at 314. The court read Gore as permitting states to
"punish the conduct of an out-of-state defendant if it has an impact on them regardless of whether the conduct might be lawful elsewhere." Id. However, the court
found, to permit plaintiffs to state a cause of action based on violation of statutes
establishing procedures for debt collection in California (which specified, among
other provisions, a California venue in which such actions must be filed) would be to
give such statutes impermissible extraterritorial effect. Id. at 316-17. The court suggested, for example, that if (contrary to the actual facts of the case) the Yus "had
traveled every month to Virginia and maintained a bank account there" it would be
improper for California to require that proceedings against them be filed in California alone. Id. at 317.
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The Internet and ExtraterritorialityConcerns

Situations in which state law may have nationwide effect have also
arisen frequently in the Internet context. The early days of the
Internet sparked widespread discussion about what it would mean for
traditional territorial notions of law and power. David Johnson and
David Post, for example, famously argued that "[c]yberspace radically
undermines the relationship between legally significant (online) phenomena and physical location" by enabling communication without
regard to geography and without any of the usual physical "cues" that
make location significant. 228 Thus, many scholars worried, for example, that the Internet might require revision of the minimum contacts
standard for personal jurisdiction because of the potentially far-flung
and unforeseeable geographical effects of posting information on the
Web. 229 Further, many believed the Internet raised serious extraterritoriality problems under the dormant Commerce Clause because the
wide geographical reach of Internet activity was likely to subject
23 0
Internet users to overbroad or inconsistent state regulation.
In early cases involving Internet regulation, courts announced a
number of concerns about the potentially nationwide implications of
state regulation. In American LibrariesAss'n v. Patak23 1 (ALA), a federal district court found invalid under the Commerce Clause a New
York statute making it a crime to knowingly send sexual or pornographic material to a minor using computer-to-computer transmission.23 2 The court cited both Edgar and Gore in support of the
228 David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,
48 STAN. L. REv. 1367, 1370-71 (1996). Johnson and Post thought that these attributes of the Internet would pose problems for substantive law incorporating notions of
geographical boundaries, such as trademark law, which relies on the notion that a
particular mark has meaning within a bounded geographical area. See id. at 1376-77.
229 See, e.g., Robert W. Hamilton & Gregory A. Castanias, Tangled Web: Personal
Jurisdiction and the Internet, LITIGATION, Winter 1998, at 27, 27 ("When it comes to
issues of personal jurisdiction, the law doesn't seem to know quite what to make of the
Web."); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1996)
(arguing that the Internet will require new theories of personal jurisdiction).
230 See, e.g., Spencer Kass, Regulation and the Internet, 26 S.U. L. REv. 93, 104-05
(1998) (finding that, because "[t]he Internet primarily encompasses fields which are
traditionally national in origin," it was likely to raise dormant Commerce Clause

issues); James E. Gaylord, Note, State RegulatoiyJurisdiction and the Internet: Letting the
Dormant Commerce Clause Lie, 52 VAND. L. REv. 1095, 1096 (1999) (noting that many
believe that "the information superhighway is a dangerous new means for states to
export their legislative products to other jurisdictions").
231 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
232 See id. at 163-64 (describing N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 235.15(1), 235.20(6),
235.21(3), 235.23(3), 235.24 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1999)).
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proposition that the Commerce Clause "embodies a principle of comity that mandates that one state not expand its regulatory powers in a
manner that encroaches upon the sovereignty of its fellow states"-a
"horizontal limitation," in addition to the "vertical limitation" vis-A-vis
23 3
federal authority that the Commerce Clause places on state power.
Seen in this light, the statute represented New York's improper
attempt to "deliberately impose[] its legislation on the Internet and,
234
by doing so, project[] its law into other states."
In reaching this conclusion, the court went so far as to suggest
that state regulation of the Internet was inherently inappropriate. As
the court observed, "state regulation of those aspects of commerce
that by their unique nature demand cohesive national treatment is
offensive to the Commerce Clause." 23 5 The Internet was one of those

areas, the court argued, because "states' jurisdictional limits are
related to geography; geography, however, is a virtually meaningless
236
construct on the Internet."
While ALA was one of the more forceful judicial expressions of
concern about possible extraterritorial effects of state regulation of
the Internet, other courts relied on ALA's reasoning to invalidate similar state prohibitions on pornographic communications. 23 7 Other
state courts considered related Commerce Clause concerns in striking
238
down state anti-spam laws.

For two reasons, ALA and similar cases have complicated extraterritoriality analysis. First, they represent a forceful revival by lower
courts of the extraterritoriality concerns of Edgar and Healy-and, in
some ways, an extension of those principles. 23 9 ALA, for example,
expanded the potential reach of Edgar and Healy by explicitly
extending their reasoning from core commercial activities (corporate
233
234
235
236
237
238

Id. at 175-76.
Id. at 177.
Id. at 169.
Id.
See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 164, at 792 n.45 (citing cases).
See id. at 793-94 & nn.57-60; see alsoJeffrey D. Zentner, Note, State Regulation of

Unsolicited Bulk Commercial E-mail and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 8 VAND.J. Er. &
L. 477, 484-87 (2006) (discussing state cases in California and Washington that
addressed Commerce Clause claims in relation to anti-spam laws).
239 See Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace,91 CAL. L. REV. 521, 530 (2003) (noting that courts have applied the dormant Commerce Clause "somewhat differently"
where the Internet is concerned-that is, they are "more likely to invalidate state regulation of the Internet under the dormant commerce clause because the inherently
interstate nature of Internet communications burdens a larger class of people with
understanding and complying with a multitude of regulations").
TECH.
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takeovers, liquor sales) to not-for-profit communications. 240 Second,
courts-in ALA and otherwise-have relied on arguments that draw
from the due process concerns of Gore as well as the Commerce
Clause reasoning of Edgar. Thus, the court in ALA suggested, overbroad state regulation had the potential to hamper individual freedom as well as sister state autonomy. Because of the Internet's
"unique nature," a substantial risk existed "that a single actor might be
subject to haphazard, uncoordinated, and even outright inconsistent
regulation by states that the actor never intended to reach and possibly was unaware were being accessed." 24 1 Such language echoes not
only Gore but also personal jurisdiction cases that seek to protect
defendants from being haled into court based on "'random,"' "'fortuitous,"' or "'attenuated"' contacts, 242 as opposed to "actions by the
defendant himself that create a 'substantial connection' with the forum
State."

24 3

Despite the potentially far-reaching implications of these ideas,
the Internet has not brought about the complete revolution in thinking about territoriality that early commentators predicted. In recent
years, many courts have upheld statutes prohibiting transmission of
pornography to minors, distinguishing them from ALA by relying on
provisions that, unlike the original New York statute at issue, require
an intent to seduce the minor, thus "greatly narrow[ing] the scope of
the law and its concomitant effect on interstate commerce." 244 More
broadly, governments and courts have recognized that the Internet is
not some autonomous realm free of physical ties; rather, it involves
"users, hardware and software, Internet service providers, and financial institutions" who have a physical location and who can be regulated or found liable. 245 Further, technological advances-such as the

ability of both Internet providers and governments to block content
from being seen in a particular jurisdiction-have also allowed the
Internet to be increasingly regulated according to traditional geo240 ALA, 969 F. Supp. at 172 ("The non-profit nature of certain entities that use
the Internet or of certain transactions that take place over the Internet does not take
the Internet outside the Commerce Clause.").
241 Id. at 168-69.
242 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (quoting first
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984), then World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980)).
243 Id. (quoting McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)).
244 People v. Garelick, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 815, 825 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing People v.
Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 190-92 (Ct. App. 2000); Hatch v. Superior Court, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 453, 472 (Ct. App. 2000)).
245 Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 164, at 785-86.
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Finally, while the dormant Commerce

Clause implications of state Internet regulation continue to be
debated, the focus of discussion has shifted to some extent from the
Edgar extraterritoriality principle to the more conventional dormant
24 7
Commerce Clause issues of protectionism and balancing.
Nonetheless, one can still make two broad generalizations about
the Internet: first, it increases the number and variety of situations in
which the laws of more than one jurisdiction can potentially come
into collision; second, it arguably requires at least some rethinking of
traditional geographical cues and markers, thus enabling a range of
new arguments about which sovereign's law applies in a given situation. 248 As a result, arguments from ALA and similar cases continue
to crop up in new areas of law-for example, state prohibitions on
Internet gambling. 249 Thus, it is fair to say that the existence of the
Internet has reraised in a new form the sort of questions discussed in
Edgarand Healy, and made the need for a coherent understanding of
the limits of state power more acute.
C. Nationwide Injunctions Pursuant to State Law and
Other ProblematicJudicial Remedies
While some commentators have regarded the Commerce Clause
as a limit on judicial as well as legislative activity, 250 the Edgar line of

cases does not discuss how they might apply to actions by state courts
applying state law. Nonetheless, at least a handful of courts have read
246

See Joel R. Reidenberg, Technology and InternetJurisdiction,153 U. PA. L.

REV.

1951, 1953 (2005) (noting that increasingly sophisticated information technology
both increases the nexus between Internet users and their home jurisdiction and permits governments to enforce Internet regulations technologically rather than legally).
247

See, e.g., Mark B. Dubnoff, State Bans on Internet Gambling May Be Unconstitu-

tional, 12 GAMING L. REv. & ECON. 207, 218 (2008) (analyzing issue of state prohibitions on Internet gaming primarily in terms of traditional Pike analysis).
248 One interesting twist, for example, is that many advocates of increased Internet
freedom from governmental regulation have married new technology to traditional
formalism by relying on highly territorial principles of regulation-arguing, for example, that substantive law is inapplicable if "it is not the law of the place where the
Internet activity was launched, such as the place where the server is located." See
Reidenberg, supra note 246, at 1956-57.
249 See Dubnoff, supra note 247, at 217.
250 See Horowitz, supra note 165, at 814 (noting that the logic of dormant Commerce Clause cases applies to the choice-of-law context and urging the adoption of "a
general principle for application of the commerce clause in making choice-of-law
decisions in cases involving commercial transactions: where more than one state has
an interest in having its law prevail, the court should choose the governing law that
would best facilitate multistate commercial transactions").
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such cases to prohibit the application of state law by courts to wholly
out-of-state conduct. This has been true especially in circumstances
where courts are asked to issue nationwide injunctions pursuant to
state law that may reach conduct permissible in other states. Even
prior to Gore and Campbell, many courts and commentators articulated
doubts under the existing law of extraterritoriality about the propriety
of issuing nationwide injunctions under state law or other state-law
remedies with "extraterritorial" effects. Thus, in a 1992 article, David
Welkowitz addressed the possible problems of extraterritoriality created by the issuance of nationwide state injunctions against the use of
trademarks that violated state antidilution protections. 251 At the time
of Welkowitz's article (the enactment of federal antidilution law has
since changed the legal landscape), about half the states had antidilution laws, 252 while the other half had no restrictions. 253 As Welkowitz
noted, widespread use of nationwide injunctions by the states with
antidilution statutes could have the effect of undermining policy
254
choices by the states that had chosen not to enact such statutes.
Further, such injunctions could have the effect of permitting a state
251 See Welkowitz, supra note 11, at 3-4; see also Brendan Mahaffey-Dowd, Famous
Trademarks: Ordinary Inquiry by the Courts of Marks Entitled to an ExtraordinaryRemedy, 64
BROOK. L. REv. 423, 433 (1998) (noting that the House Report proposing federal
antidilution legislation cited the reluctance of state courts to issue nationwide injunctions as ajustification for federal action). Note that the passage of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (2006)), renders moot the particular issue of
disparate state antidilution statutes, though the underlying problem of state courts'
power to issue state law injunctions with nationwide effects (particularly when substantive law differs significantly from state to state) remains the same.
252 In the trademark sense, "'dilution' occurs when the marketing value of a wellknown trademark is diminished by the use of the mark on other, usually noncompeting, goods. The public identification of the mark with a single source or product is
said to lessen as a result of these other uses, even if the public is not deceived or
confused about the source of the other goods." Welkowitz, supra note 11, at 3 n.3.
253 See id. at 6. At the time, federal trademark law did not include antidilution
protections; that has since changed. See supra note 251. However, it is still frequently
the case that related areas of law, such as laws governing unfair competition, vary
substantially from state to state while frequently applying to nationwide activity. See
Paul Heald, Comment, Unfair Competition and FederalLaw: ConstitutionalRestraints on
the Scope of State Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1411, 1412 (1987). Another issue that has the
potential to trigger extraterritoriality concerns is the enforceability of noncompete
agreements. For example, in Application Group, Inc. v. Hunter Group, Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr.
2d 73, 76-77 (Ct. App. 1998), a California court refused to enforce a noncompete
agreement between a company incorporated and headquartered in Maryland and its
Maryland-based employee, notwithstanding the fact that the agreement specified that
it would be governed by Maryland law.
254 See Welkowitz, supra note 11, at 68-69.
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court to exert regulatory control over wholly out-of-state activity-an
action that would seem to run directly afoul of the prohibitions in
255

Edgar.

Based on these sorts of extraterritoriality concerns, some courts
have hesitated to issue injunctions that would have the effect of applying a particular state's policies to nationwide activity. In Hyatt Corp. v.
Hyatt Legal Services,256 for example, one federal court refused to issue a
nationwide injunction pursuant to a state antidilution statute on the
257
grounds that it would violate the Edgar extraterritoriality principle.
As the court reasoned, the proposed injunction would "reach way
beyond the limits of Illinois, affecting advertising and promotion in
areas which have little, if any, effect on the strength of plaintiffs trade'258
mark within Illinois.
Similar concerns have guided courts even outside the antidilution
context. In Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.,259 the Third
Circuit suggested rather cryptically that an injunction based solely on
New Jersey law governing "unprivileged imitation" would, "in accordance with the full faith and credit clause, be valid only in New
Jersey." 260 Similarly, a federal district court in California expressed
concern about issuing an injunction under a California unfair business practices statute aimed at changing the corporate policies of a
brokerage operating nationally. 2 6' In affirming (though primarily on
different grounds), the Ninth Circuit found that, because the injunction would reach activities such as "the format of ... monthly statements" that "necessitate [d] decision-making at the national level," the
action "[sought] to directly regulate interstate commerce" and was
thus unconstitutional. 262 Finally, a Tennessee court, citing Hyatt,
found that an order enjoining the defendant, a private security firm,
from inducing former employees to breach restrictive covenants, was
"overly broad and inappropriate" 263 given that "the level of support
255 See id. at 38-39. Welkowitz himself, however, does not advocate such a broad
understanding of the extraterritoriality principle. See id. at 38-40.
1985).
256 610 F. Supp. 381 (N.D. Ill.
257 Id. at 385.
258 Id.
259 747 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1984).
260 Id. at 854 & n.6.
261 Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc. v. Greenberg, Nos. CV-93-0609-R, CV-93-0623-R,
1993 WL 144856, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 1993); see also Rostron, supra note 1, at 141
(discussing Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc. v. Greenberg, No. 93-55535, 1995 WL
392028 (9th Cir. July 3, 1995)).
262 Shearson Lehman Bros., 1995 WL 392028, at *3.
263 Guardsmark, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Protective Servs., No. 2A01-9409-CH-00207,
1998 WL 959664, at *9-10, 13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1998).
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for the enforcement of restrictive covenants may differ from state to
2 64

state."

These cases, obviously, occur at the margins of extraterritoriality
doctrine; only a handful of courts have raised such concerns, and
many have rejected the notion that any difficulty exists with issuing
nationwide injunctions based on state law. 265

Nonetheless, the exis-

tence of these cases makes manifest the very real theoretical possibility
that the Edgar line of cases might also be applied to the actions of
state courts. Such cases thus raise fundamental questions about the
nature of extraterritoriality prohibitions. Do state laws such as the
antidilution statute at issue in Hyatt run afoul of the Commerce
Clause merely by their existence? If not, is it the judicial act of applying such laws to a particular situation-or ordering a given remedythat creates the problem of extraterritoriality? And if the latter, is the
entire issue better characterized as a choice-of-law problem rather
than a dormant Commerce Clause one?
Concerns about Edgar's application to judicial actions have
cropped up in other areas as well. In Campbell v. Arco Marine, Inc.,26 6 a
California appeals court held that a Washington resident, Michelle
Campbell, who was offered ajob over the phone at her home with an
oil transport company headquartered in Long Beach, California,
could not take advantage of the sexual harassment provisions of the
California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA)2 6 7 for events
that occurred in Washington and at sea.26 8 As the court found, " [t] he
relationship with California is slight": Campbell was hired while living
in Washington, her job duties were performed on the high seas, and
the alleged harassment had taken place either at sea or in Washington. 269 The court thus avoided what it called "serious constitutional
concerns" by construing FEHA-in the absence of clear legislative
intent to the contrary-not to apply to nonresidents employed
outside California. 270 Interestingly, the trial court had reached the
same conclusion as to FEHA, but allowed the plaintiffs common law
264 Id. at *12.
265 See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., No. 94 CIV. 2322 (DLC), 1995 WL
81299, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 1995) (noting that while a few courts have found
problems with nationwide injunctions based on state law, "[t]he weight of authority ... is, however, to the contrary").

266
267

268
269
270

50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 626 (Ct. App. 1996).
CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 12900-12996 (West 2008).
Campbell, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 627-28.
Id. at 631.
Id. at 631-32.
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defamation claim, based on the same series of events, to proceed. 271
Because Campbell subsequently dismissed this claim voluntarily, it was
272
not before the court of appeals.
The Supreme Court has never delineated the precise boundaries
of the circumstances under which the Edgar extraterritoriality principle applies, nor articulated any reason why it should not also be relevant to judicial actions. Thus, it is unsurprising that some courts have
interpreted Edgar to limit their freedom to issue injunctions mandating out-of-state actions or to award damages based on out-of-state conduct. Such interpretations also, however, bring Edgar into collision
with the liberal Hague standard.
D.

The Question of Contractual Choice of Law

A second area suggesting change in the relationship between
choice-of-law doctrine and the extraterritoriality principle (especially
as that principle relates to inherent limits on state sovereignty) is in
the controversy over the extent to which contracting parties should be
permitted to choose the law that will apply to their transaction. In
general, the degree to which individual choice of law should be permitted in contracting has always been fraught with some tension.
Early theorists were dubious about allowing contracting parties to
select the law of their choice, precisely because such an action mimics
state regulation; Beale, for example, described this sort of provision as
2 73
a "legislative act."
Nonetheless, under modern choice-of-law regimes, most states
have permitted parties to a contract to increase predictability by
choosing among the various states' laws that might plausibly be construed to apply to their transaction should a dispute arising out of the
271 Id. at 629.
272 Id. This case thus raises the question of whether a state court's application of a
statute to events occurring out of state might raise constitutional problems that reliance on state common law does not.
273 See Richard K Greenstein, Is the Proposed U.C. C. Choice of Law Provision Unconstitutional?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 1159, 1164 (2000) (describing Beale's view of contractual
choice of law). It should be noted, of course, that contractual choice of law is not the
only way in which parties may exercise influence over the law they wish to have
applied to their transactions. Parties can also shape their activities (by, say, incorporating in Delaware) to increase the likelihood that the law of a particular state will
apply to their disputes. Moreover, because states continue to employ a variety of
choice-of-law principles, parties can bring suit, or attempt to avoid it, in particular
states based on the substantive law that those states are likely to find applicable to the
suit.
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contract end up in court.2 74 This regime permits some degree of

party choice, but does not pose significant problems under the Hague
framework, since whatever state's law is chosen by the parties will presumably have the requisite number of contacts with the underlying
dispute.
This way of handling the contractual choice-of-law issue, however,
has been called into question by two proposed pieces of model legislation. First, the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
(UCITA), model legislation intended to fill in perceived gaps of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) with respect to software transactions, includes a choice-of-law provision that permits contracting parties to select the law of their choice without restriction and without
the requirement of any connection to the chosen jurisdiction. 275 In
addition, proposed revisions to the UCC itself include a new choice-oflaw approach that would permit parties to select the law of any jurisdiction so long as it did not contravene a fundamental policy of the
jurisdiction whose law would otherwise be applicable. 2 76 The liberal
understanding of contractual choice of law implicit in both provisions
is in contrast to the prior version of the UCC and to what is fairly
universal state choice-of-law practice, both of which require that parties select the law of a jurisdiction that bears a reasonable relationship
to the transaction (subject to a public policy exception as well).277
There are many justifications for permitting greater party autonomy in contractual choice of law-from the allegedly reduced impor274 See William J. Woodward, Jr., Contractual Choice of Law: Legislative Choice in an
Era of Party Autonomy, 54 SMU L. REv. 697, 700, 704 (2001) (describing the limited
freedom of parties to choose which forum's law will apply to their transaction).
275 See UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS Acr § 109 cmt. 2a (Proposed Official
Draft 2002) (noting that the model statute's choice-of-law provision-section
109(a)-does not follow U.C.C. § 1-105 "which requires that the selected state have a
'reasonable relationship' to the transaction. In a global information economy, limitations of that type are inappropriate, especially in cyberspace where physical locations
are often irrelevant or not knowable. Parties may appropriately wish to select a neutral forum because neither is familiar with the law of the other's jurisdiction. In such
a case, the chosen state's law may have no relationship at all to the transaction").
276 See U.C.C. § 1-301 (f) (2004) ("[A choice of law agreement] is not effective to
the extent that application of the law of the State or country designated would be
contrary to a fundamental policy of the State or country whose law would govern in
the absence of agreement .... ).
277 See Woodward, supra note 274, at 712. Notably, however, states have only
rarely invalidated parties' contractual choice of law on such grounds, perhaps because
their unenforceability is so clear that parties do not include them in the first place.
See id. at 716-17 (discussing this phenomenon and speculating about why it might be
the case).
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tance of borders in Internet-based transactions 2 78 to the need to
facilitate contracting between parties located in different jurisdictions
by permitting them to choose a "neutral" state's law. 2 79 Nonetheless,
these arguments have not been persuasive to many scholars and legislators. In both cases, the new provisions aroused great controversy
and have met with virtually no legislative success. 280 Numerous commentators have suggested that a choice-of-law provision that dispenses
with the "reasonable relationship" requirement might be unconstitutional-relying, in particular, on the notion that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause might, under some circumstances, require the application of the law of a state having an interest in a transaction-a position advocated by Justice Stevens in his Hague concurrence but not
28 1
reflected in established doctrine.

The constitutional and policy objections to the proposed choiceof-law provisions clearly do not fit neatly into the due process framework of Hague. The law of a state freely selected by contracting parties
is presumably not "unfair" or "arbitrary"-at least if arbitrariness is
assessed with respect to the desires and expectations of the contracting parties.2 8 2 Further, the parties' very decision to apply the
law of the chosen state also arguably constitutes a sufficient contact
278 See supra note 228.
279 See Jack M. Graves, Party Autonomy in Choice of Commercial Law: The Failure of
Revised U.C. C. § 1-301 and a Proposalfor Broader Reform, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 59, 76
(2005) (noting that the more liberal choice-of-law provisions avoid the problem of
contracting parties from more than one jurisdiction whose "domocentric" biases create an inherent conflict).
280 The UCITA has proved unpopular for a number of reasons (some of them
having nothing to do with choice of law), and as of this writing has been adopted only
by Maryland and Virginia (though other states have enacted certain of its features).
See Ams for Fair Elec. Commerce Transactions, Links and Resources, http://www.
ucita.com/linksl.html#egislation (last visited Feb. 28, 2009). Indeed, several states
adopted "bomb shelter" legislation prospectively invalidating as contrary to public
policy any attempt by contracting parties to take advantage of UCITA provisions. Id.
Likewise, although many states have enacted other features of the revised UCC, none
has chosen to include the new choice-of-law provisions. Posting of Keith A. Rowley to
Commercial Law, http://ucclaw.blogspot.com/2008/05/tennessee-enacts-reviseducc-article-1.html (May 24, 2008, 18:10 EDT).
281 See Greenstein, supra note 273, at 1174-75 (arguing that Full Faith and Credit
Clause analysis under Hague should be-as Justice Stevens' concurrence advocateddistinguished from due process analysis).
282 See id. at 1173 ("Since application of [the chosen] law is precisely what the
parties contracted for, it is hard to imagine what due process complaint either could
raise."). Fairness issues are perhaps raised by the choice of an arbitrary state's law in a
contract of adhesion, but the force of this objection is undermined by the fact that
courts generally permit enforcement of similar provisions in arbitration clauses. See
Graves, supra note 279, at 84-85 (describing how parties might use the generally
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with the state to satisfy the Hague framework (though some have questioned this conclusion). 283 Finally, the Full Faith and Credit objections urged by some scholars 28 4 also seem hard to square with current
doctrine. In many contractual dealings, a number of states will have a
reasonable relationship of some sort to the underlying transaction. It
therefore seems difficult to argue (at least within the framework of
Hague) that any particular state has an interest in having its law
applied.
As a result, it seems most logical to understand the objection to
unlimited contractual choice of law as reflecting a fundamental concern with sovereignty and extraterritoriality, and an unease with
allowing state law to apply to events to which it has no physical or
territorial connection. This presents a slightly different problem of
extraterritoriality from most of the examples discussed in this paper,
since any perceived problem with the liberal proposed provisions
results from private individuals choosing to extend ajurisdiction's law
to events to which it has no connection, not from a state overreaching
in attempting to regulate out-of-state conduct. Yet the contractual
choice-of-law problem is like the other issues of extraterritoriality in
that it hinges on a concern that allowing a state to exercise undue
influence beyond its borders will interfere with the sovereign rights of
sister states. 28 5 If parties favor the law of a particular jurisdiction on a
particular substantive matter, that jurisdiction will obviously gain disproportionate influence in determining how that issue tends to be
decided nationwide. Thus, unlimited contractual choice of law raises
concerns about the structural balance of power among the statesconcerns that are not clearly addressed by the Hague line of cases.
III.

RECONCILING EXTRATERRITORIALITY DOCTRINES

The preceding sections have described two lines of cases setting
outer limits on the extent to which states can make their laws applicafavorable attitude of courts toward arbitration to choose UCITA in their contracts
through an arbitration clause).
283 See, e.g., Greenstein, supra note 273, at 1174-75 (asking-and answering in the
negative-whether merely choosing a given state's law is a sufficient contact under
Hague).
284 See, e.g., id. at 1173 (arguing that the amendments to the UCC are likely in
breach of the Full Faith and Credit Clause because they remove the requirement of a
connection between the transaction and the forum).
285 See Graves, supra note 279, at 61 ("[O]pponents of expanded party autonomy
suggest that, if the parties are granted complete autonomy, they may abuse it to
deprive a state of its sovereign power to legislate for the benefit and protection of its
citizenry.").
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ble to out-of-state persons and conduct. Those two lines of cases stem
from conceptually separate origins, but in practice sometimes blur
and overlap, leading to confusion about the exact scope of the extraterritoriality principle, and about the relationship between judicial
acts and legislative ones. Further, while the Supreme Court has suggested in cases like Gore and Campbell that the two lines of cases may
overlap, it has never fully reconciled them. As a result, the current
doctrine lacks coherence, clear boundaries, and ease of application.
With these problems in mind, this Part argues that the tests for
choice of law and for legislative acts should be integrated-that state
courts applying forum law to out-of-state conduct and legislatures purporting to enact law to govern such conduct are exercising state
power in a similar way, and that both sorts of activities potentially raise
concerns related to state sovereignty and due process. Thus, it makes
sense to treat them under a single rubric, and to recognize that cases
from Edgar to Hague to Gore are motivated by a unified set of concerns. Having argued for an essentially unified standard, this Part,
however, goes on to make the more tentative case that, in limited circumstances, some acts of extraterritorial regulation by states perhaps
should be treated differently from others-though these differences
should fall along different lines than those that current doctrine recognizes. Finally, this Part closes by arguing that any harmonization of
the Hague and Edgar lines of cases will require a substantive re-envisioning of the law of extraterritoriality.
I emphasize that the various ideas for reform I propose throughout this Part are tentative and exploratory. The intention of this Article is not to rewrite substantive extraterritoriality jurisprudence, or to
pronounce definitively upon how far states should be able to go in
regulating out-of-state conduct. That task is obviously beyond this
Article's scope, and a variety of frameworks-constitutional, economic, procedural-would have to come into play in analyzing this
issue. I simply want to suggest that, whatever substantive degree of
extraterritorial regulation we want to permit, the current framework
does a poor job of accommodating it. The aim of this Part, therefore,
is not to propose a definitive solution, but simply to suggest several
lines along which current doctrine might develop toward greater
28 6
coherence.
286 Throughout this discussion, I have assumed that courts should be the lead
actors in any such doctrinal revision-an assumption that requires some explanation,
given that Congress also possesses powers to act in this area. The Effects Clause of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause, which provides that "the Congress may by general Laws
prescribe the Manner in which such [state] Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effect thereof," U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1, is generally understood to
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Choice of Law and ExtraterritorialLegislation:
The Casefor Unification

This subpart argues that because the Edgar and Hague lines of
cases deal with what is essentially the same problem, they are best
dealt with within the same doctrinal framework.
confer on Congress the power to fashion interstate choice-of-law rules if it chooses,
including the power to prescribe the extraterritorial effects of state legislation. See,
e.g., Rosen, "Hard"or "Soft"Pluralism,supra note 26, at 752-53. Because Congress has
the power to statutorily override the Supreme Court's dormant Commerce Clause
decisions, Congress likely has the power to revise the Supreme Court's Edgar/Healy
jurisprudence as well. It should be noted that it cannot be said with absolute certainty
that Congress possesses this second power. We do not know whether the principle
that Edgar and Healy articulate is exclusively rooted in the dormant Commerce
Clause; both the Court's language in Edgarand Healy themselves and its later reliance
on these cases in Gore and Campbell suggest that it is possibly better conceived as an
inference from constitutional structure more generally. Nonetheless, it is fair to say
that Congress certainly has the power to revise the Hagueside of the extraterritoriality
equation, and perhaps to reconsider the Healy side as well. Why, then, leave the solution to the courts?
I am not prepared to say that there are no areas of the extraterritoriality problem
in which Congress may productively intervene. Indeed, assuming that Congress does
indeed have some power to revise Healy, there is no reason why Congress could not
take an active role in the partial unification of the Healy and Hague principles I suggest. I would nonetheless argue, however, that it is desirable for courts to take the
first cut at the problem, for two central reasons. First, as I have argued, the reasoning
underlying extraterritoriality decisions like Healy has influenced courts in formulating
a variety of areas of doctrine, from limits on punitive damages to Internet regulation.
It would therefore be immensely beneficial for courts considering the numerous spillover effects of an extraterritoriality principle to have the benefit not merely of a more
coherent set of rules but of a comprehensively re-imagined understanding of the
problem. Second, to the extent the extraterritoriality problem plays out against the
backdrop of conflicts-of-law doctrine, courts simply have a great deal more experience
in appreciating the nuances of choice-of-law problems. However unsatisfactory current choice-of-law doctrine may be in certain respects, it nonetheless reflects many
years of trial and error that should not be discarded lightly. It is hard to think of a
congressional solution that could address the problem with the needed degree of
subtlety and flexibility.
In this I respectfully disagree with Professor Rosen, who has argued that the normative choices inherent in decisionmaking about extraterritoriality demand the
involvement of an elected branch. See Rosen, "Hard"or "Soft" Pluralism, supra note 26,
at 752. Rosen argues, "Only clear cut institutional advantages would justify allocating
this heavily normative-based decision to the least democratically accountable branch
of government." Id. In response to Professor Rosen, I would argue that (1) the theoretical check Congress provides on judicial overreaching functions as some mechanism of democratic accountability (as is true in the more ordinary dormant
Commerce Clause context) and (2) courts do indeed possess institutional advantages
sufficient to justify permitting them at least the first approach to the problem.
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A first argument to be made in favor of this understanding is that
the concerns underlying the Hague "aggregation of contacts" framework already incorporate-or at least substantially overlap withthose that motivate the Edgar extraterritoriality principle. That is, in
terms of their explicit reasoning, the Hague principles are rooted primarily in notions of due process and individual fairness, with perhaps
a token nod to ideas of interstate comity. But it is, in many respects
(and as Reese's influential article argues),287 difficult to separate principles of fairness to individuals from those of appropriate solicitude
for the policy decisions of states.
Take, for example, the classic (if seldom arising) scenario of
problematic extraterritorial effects: imposing liability on a person for
an act he was required to perform in his home jurisdiction. 28 8 The
idea of subjecting a person to inconsistent obligations, noncompliance with either one of which will expose him to potential liability or
other sanctions, raises obvious fairness concerns. 28 9 Indeed, the
Supreme Court in Gore suggested that even less acute problems of regulatory inconsistency-such as the problem of conduct lawful in one
jurisdiction being subject to liability in another-constituted a potential infringement on individual due process rights. 290 The Court
observed that "'[t] o punish a person because he has done what the
law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic
sort.'

"291

If the problem of being subject to unexpected or inconsistent
regulations by a state to which one has minimal connection is one of
due process, it is also one of federalism. Due process, of course,
implies the right to be free of state power exercised arbitrarily or
unfairly. But when a state exerts influence outside its borders, the
rights potentially affected are notjust those of individuals but of other
287 Reese, supra note 7, at 1594-95.
288 This problem is discussed at length by Reese, who (writing before the Court's
decision in Hague) believed that limits on legislative jurisdiction should be grounded
in the Due Process Clause. See id. at 1595.
289 See id.
290 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572-74, 573 n.19 (1996).
291 Id. at 573 n.19 (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978)).
Note that Bordenkircher,the original source for this statement, uses it in a wholly different context-to make the wholly unremarkable point that a criminal defendant cannot be punished for relying on his legal rights (for example, a defendant cannot be
punished more harshly because he has chosen to attack his original conviction). See
Bordenkircher,434 U.S. at 363. It is a significant extension of this principle to say that
similar due process concerns are at stake when a defendant engages in conduct that,
while legal in the jurisdiction where it occurs, may potentially subject him to liability
in another.
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states whose separate right to regulate the relevant events is being
encroached upon. Importantly, a state that ignores due process guarantees through the heedless application of forum law is generally violating the rights not only of the defendants in question but of another
state.292 In other words, if State X imposes its law on a dispute that is
properly governed by the law of State Yor State Z, it is not only interfering with the negative rights of the defendants to act unhindered by
State X's laws, but also with the affirmative rights of State Yand State
Z to decide what substantive standards should apply to the conduct at
issue. Thus, the problem is connected both to ideological principles
of federalism (that is, the idea that states are entitled to some autonomous sphere in which to make policy free of interference from other
sovereigns) and practical realities of federalism (the fact that state-bystate regulation will cease to function if citizens cannot be sure
whether their conduct is lawful or unlawful).293
Hague choice of law and Edgar extraterritoriality concerns are
thus thematically linked. An additional argument in favor of integrating them, however, is that they do not merely touch upon similar concerns, but are also conceptually impossible to separate. Suppose a
Massachusetts litigant in Connecticut court argues that a Connecticut
statute has impermissibly extraterritorial effects. A previous section of
292 Justice Stevens' concurrence in Hague attempts to work out a variation on this
distinction, separating the choice-of-law inquiry into two questions: whether the
forum can apply its law in a particular situation, and whether the forum has an obligation to apply another state's law. See supra note 102. Federalism concerns may be
triggered, however, even if there is no other one particular state that has the exclusive
right to apply its law. Thus, there may be circumstances in which any of States Yor Z
or A may properly apply its law, but the application of State X law may overstep the
boundaries of State Xs power. This interferes not with the rights of a particular state
but with the more general balance of power among all states, which may all have an
interest in not allowing State X to exceed the limits of its legitimate authority.
293 In this, the problem of extraterritoriality resembles that of personal jurisdiction, which also integrates notions of personal fairness with broader structural concerns of territoriality and federalism. Indeed, the Court has analogized the
prohibition on extraterritoriality to limits on personal jurisdiction, observing that
"[t]he limits on a State's power to enact substantive legislation are similar to the limits
on the jurisdiction of state courts." See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982)
(plurality opinion). The Edgar Court also relied on Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186
(1977), the classic quasi in rem case, when proposing that "'any attempt "directly" to
assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over persons or property would offend sister States
and exceed the inherent limits of the State's power.'" Edgar, 457 U.S. at 643 (plurality opinion) (quoting Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 197). As Rostron points out, however, the
citation to Shaffer is puzzling since in the cited passage, the Court was summarizing
Pennoyer-era conceptions of territoriality, not accurately stating current law. See Rostron, supra note 1, at 131.
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this Article suggests that perhaps a subtle difference exists between an
argument that Connecticut law cannot apply at all in this situation
and an argument that this particular statute, applied in this situation,
has impermissibly extraterritorial effects. 29 4 This distinction seems
particularly easy to grasp when a statute is directly aimed at out-ofstate conduct, as was true in the alcohol price affirmation cases. 29 5 In
Healy, no one was arguing that there was anything improper with the
application of Connecticut law to the brewers in general, or even that
distillers could not be subject to ordinary Connecticut penalties and
liabilities as a result of their activities selling beer in Connecticut.
Rather, the argument was that the specific scheme of regulatory
approval the statute created was unconstitutional because it was
296
directed at wholly out-of-state conduct.
However reasonable-even obvious-this distinction seems, however, it requires some interrogation. A court's decision to apply a particular state's law never happens in a void; it necessarily hinges on the
circumstances of the individual litigant and cause of action. Thus, for
example, it is possible to imagine the Hague test being satisfied as to
one cause of action as to a particular defendant but not as to another.
As a result, it is essentially meaningless to say that, because Connecticut law could apply to the brewers as to other aspects of their conduct,
the choice-of-law analysis is separate from the analysis of the constitutionality of this particular piece of legislation. True, the mechanisms
of enforcement of particular statutes or regulations may be different,
and that may affect the manner in which the issue of their constitutionality is raised in court. For example, Healy was an affirmative challenge to the price affirmation legislation brought by a brewers'
organization as a plaintiff.2

97

But that does not mean that it would

equally raise constitutional problems for a court to apply the statute to
the brewers in some more conventional conflicts-of-law context. Suppose, for example, that the problem in Healy had arisen because the
Connecticut statute created a cause of action for restitution for con294 See supra Part I.B.2.
295 See supra notes 153-58 and accompanying text.
296 Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336-37 (1989).
297 Id. at 327-28. The procedural posture in Brown-Forman was slightly different.
There, the New York Liquor Authority attempted to revoke the distillers' license for
noncompliance with the price affirmation regulation; the distillers then challenged
this action in state court. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor
Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 577-78 (1986). Nonetheless, the distillers similarly argued that
New York's price affirmation statute violated the Commerce Clause on its face. Id. at

578.
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sumers who were charged higher prices than any brewers' posted
298
schedule would permit.

Further, the distinction on which the Hague/Edgar separation
appears to turn-that judicial acts such as the award of damages raise
different concerns from prospective regulation-is at best a questionable one. The imposition of after-the-fact damages for conduct can
clearly-indeed, is designed to-function as a tool of regulation.
Damages, compensatory as well as punitive, are generally intended to
have a deterrent effect and to shape prospective conduct. 29 9 Indeed,
the Supreme Court has at times explicitly embraced the view that
damages awarded by state courts involve state power in the same way
as prospective regulation. In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon 300 (cited in Gore 0 1), the Court set aside as preempted by federal
law an award of damages by a California court under state tort and
labor law for business loss caused by union picketing.30 2 In reaching
this conclusion, the Court noted that state regulation inconsistent
with national policy "can be as effectively exerted through an award of
damages as through some form of preventive relief. The obligation to
pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method
of governing conduct and controlling policy.

' 303

Perhaps, one might argue, the Hague/Edgar distinction is not
between liability and other forms of regulation, but between regulation enacted by legislators and remedies imposed by courts. But such
a distinction is equally difficult to maintain. Legislative and judicial
acts overlap enormously. In many situations, the effect of a judicially
created rule is identical to that of a legislative enactment-for example, either the courts or a legislature may announce a rule of comparative negligence, or decide that a certain activity should be subject to
strict liability. Conversely, a statute may serve as a guidepost for
courts, who may, for example, look to regulatory violations as the basis
for allowing a negligence per se claim, or may develop a common law
rule grounded in policies expressed in state statutes. For all these reasons, the Supreme Court has elsewhere recognized the similar effect
298 Along these lines, Edgars language prohibiting "the application of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders" is significant.
Edgar, 457 U.S. at 642 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). In other words, Edgar
suggests, it is the decision to apply a particular statute to particular out-of-state conduct that is what raises constitutional concerns. See id. at 642-43.
299 See Hubbard, supra note 225, at 375.
300 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
301 See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572 n.17 (1996).
302 Garmon, 359 U.S. at 237-38, 246-48.
303 Id. at 246-47.
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of state statutory enactments and common law rules, noting that
" [t]he test is not the form in which state power has been applied but,
30 4
whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised.
The difference between the two lines of cases as they have evolved
is not, then, based on meaningful distinctions between the types of
activities at issue in Hague and those at stake in Edgar. Instead, it is
likely to be something of a historical artifact, reflecting the somewhat
anomalous view of territorialism in the choice-of-law context. Historically, choice-of-law territorialism has been understood as being about
the location in which a cause of action arises, not the location of the
behavior to be regulated. 305 Even more modern choice-of-law theories have brought little clarity to the relationship between conflicts
theory and physical borders. Indeed, they have in some ways confused
it-through, for example, local law theory, which blurs distinctions
between the exercise of jurisdiction by a court and the application of
forum law by suggesting that all the law being applied by a given court
30 6
is really that of the forum.
The fact that choice-of-law theory has operated under a different
set of territorial assumptions poses a conceptual gulf that must be
crossed in integrating constitutional choice-of-law limits with the
Edgar extraterritoriality principle, or indeed with developing any theory of the limits of state legislative jurisdiction that also incorporates
conflicts theory.3 0 7 But this problem should not obscure the essential
similarity in the way state power operates in the Edgar case and in the
Hague one. This fundamental sameness means that-if we are to have
a notion of extraterritoriality that does not simply rest on arbitrary
distinctions-the tension between the two lines of cases must be grappled with, not ignored.

304 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).
elaborated:

As the Court

Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama courts

have applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid
restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of speech and press. It matters
not that that law has been applied in a civil action and that it is common law
only, though supplemented by statute.
Id.
305
306
307

See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra Part I.B.l.a.
It is notable that Reese's legislative jurisdiction proposal made an exception

for exercises of state jurisdiction that had been traditionally sanctioned by state

choice-of-law principles. See Reese, supra note 7, at 1599-600.
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Choice of Law and ExtraterritorialLegislation:
The (Possible) Casefor (Some) Divergence

The previous subpart has argued for a recognition that state
courts and state legislatures embody state power in similar ways and
that the fundamental concerns about allowing either to regulate
across state boundaries are similar. Having made this argument, however, I now want to backtrack a bit-to argue that, in certain cases, an
argument may exist for differentiating among various kinds of state
regulation in considering what territorial limits should apply.
If so much commonality exists among the different varieties of
state regulation, why should this sort of differentiation ever be appropriate? After all, as the previous subpart has argued, both legislative
and judicial actions constitute similar manifestations of state power
that are conceptually difficult to separate. This is, however, an incomplete picture in two ways. First, it fails to incorporate concerns specific
to the dormant Commerce Clause-concerns that certainly play a role
in the Edgar line of cases. Second, it fails to consider the different
potentialfor abuse of state power depending on what sort of law is at
issue. In other words, even if we think that state courts and state legislatures exercise power in the same way, it may be the case that state
legislatures have more incentives to use that power in ways that overreach. That fact might counsel for more searching scrutiny of legislative action even if the ultimate standard applied to judicial and
legislative acts is similar.
With these concerns in mind, there are at least three different
lines along which justifiable differences in approach are possible.
First, courts could apply a more rigorous standard to commercial
rather than noncommercial legislation; second, to statutes rather than
common law; and, third, to prospective regulation rather than retrospective liability.
The distinction between commercial and noncommercial activity
simply acknowledges the fact that the Commerce Clause imposes
some limits on the extent to which individual states can burden out-ofstate commerce. Even if it is true both that the problem of extraterritoriality is not merely a Commerce Clause issue and that most Commerce Clause problems do not raise issues of extraterritoriality per se,
it nonetheless also is the case that attempts by states to impose substantial restrictions on out-of-state activity often serve as pretexts for
the sort of protectionist motives that dormant Commerce Clause anal-
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ysis is designed to uncover. 308 Further, it is fair to say that, in the
Edgarline of cases, the Court, in striking down regulations as extraterritorial, has been guided at least in part by characteristic dormant
Commerce Clause concerns (such as the notion that a state may try to
unfairly advantage its residents by posing unreasonable restrictions on
the way out-of-state entities do business)309 Thus, it is appropriate to
incorporate some special concern for commercial regulation, narrowly defined, into a more general extraterritoriality standard.
The distinction between statutes and common law arises from
similar concerns as the distinction between commercial and noncommercial activity. Common law is less likely to arise from protectionist
motives, and far more difficult to implement in a way that serves narrow state interests. 3 10 The public, for example, is unlikely to assess the
abilities of even elected state judges according to whether they have
advanced the state economy relative to that of its neighbors, and as a
result state judges are subject to fewer temptations to craft law in a way
that unfairly burdens out-of-state residents. In addition, because
judges are to some degree reactive-forced to work within an existing
system of precedent and to make law appropriate to the individual
cases that happen to come before them-they arguably have less
power to act in a way that systematically and unfairly advantages state
interests. 311 By contrast, the efforts of legislatures to regulate extraterritorially may spark the same sorts of suspicions that motivate dormant
Commerce Clause inquiries-that the legislature is attempting to benefit state residents disproportionately at the expense of outsiders.

308 See Catherine Gage O'Grady, Targeting State ProtectionismInstead of InterstateDiscrimination Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 571, 600-03
(1997).

309 Indeed, Goldsmith and Sykes offer a plausible reading of the extraterritoriality
cases as motivated largely by a dormant Commerce Clause concern with disproportionate burdens on out-of-state entities; as they note, many of the Court's more sweeping statements can be dismissed as dicta. See infra note 320.
310 Cf Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784,
1882 (2008) ("Traditionally, courts articulating common-law rules have not been supposed to act like legislatures; even when a court overturns an old decision or articulates a new common-law rule in a case of first impression, the past has been thought
to constrain common-law development more than it constrains Congress.").
311 To some extent, therefore, the distinction between common and statutory law
overlaps with the distinction between prospective and retrospective law. In general,
legislatures make law prospectively, while courts can only apply law to events that have
already occurred. To begin with, it should be noted that this distinction applies only
imperfectly because courts can also act prospectively. Most obviously, for example,
courts can announce a rule that is to be applied to future cases.
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In addition, because courts can fashion common law in a way that
is inherently case specific and adaptable, common law is less likely to
result in divergent rules that will subject state citizens to conflicting
obligations. Timberlane-era international choice-of-law principles recognized that courts can apply comity principles to moderate problems
of inconsistency and unpredictability that extraterritorial laws can create. 312 Similarly, state courts can attempt to mediate conflicts among
the laws of various states by, for example, applying choice-of-law principles that take into account concerns about extraterritoriality, or by
modifying the remedy they award.3 18 Indeed, courts already have
experience doing so-since, in many cases, the choice-of-law principles they customarily apply are designed in part to foster interstate
3 14
harmony.
Finally, a case can be made that a greater level of scrutiny should
attach to ex ante regulation than after-the-fact liability. This Article
has argued that both regulation and the imposition of liability are
attempts to shape conduct, and that for the most part they should be
regarded in similar ways. But, as various commentators have
observed, the imposition of liability arguably affects actors' behavior
in different ways from prospective regulation. 315 In particular, one
might argue-borrowing from the reasoning of the handful of courts
to have considered this issue-that (1) the imposition of liability tends
to imply less of a moral judgment than the enactment of a prospective
regulation, and (2) liability permits prospective actors more freedom
to continue to engage in the conduct at issue than does a prospective
regulation3 1 6 Both of these distinctions are relevant to the question
312 See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976).
For a discussion on the Timberlane standard, see infra notes 342-45.
313 Of course, as the previous Part has pointed out, state legislation can come into
play in a number of ways and can, in certain circumstances, overlap with common law.
See discussion supra Part II. State statutes can, for example, attempt to modify or
refine the common law of liability. This sort of legislative dabbling in traditional common law areas might trigger an intermediate level of concern.
314 See Courtland H. Peterson, A Response to the Hague Symposium: Particularismin
the Conflict of Laws, 10 HOFsTRA L. REv.973, 999 (1982) (explaining various choice-oflaw policy rationales including interstate harmony). Indeed, the long experience of

state courts with managing choice-of-law principles in a way that (mostly) avoids acute
interstate conflict itself counsels in favor of giving state courts a wider presumptive

latitude to apply state law in a way that they see fit.
Richard A. Nagareda, In the Aftermath of the Mass Tort Class Action, 85
315 See, e.g.,
GEO. L.J. 295, 311-29 (1996) (comparing the effectiveness of mass tort litigation with
that of government regulation as devices to regulate social behavior).
316 See McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 169-70 (2d Cir. 1997) (Calabresi, J.,
dissenting) ("There is all of the difference in the world between making something
illegal and making it tortious. Making an activity tortious forces the people who
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of extraterritoriality, since both imply less interference with foreign
states' abilities to make public policy judgments about which conduct
is blameworthy or undesirable (hence raising fewer concerns about
federalism and the proper relationships among the states) and both
also impose a less severe burden on individuals' right to be free of
unanticipated state regulation (thus raising fewer issues of individual
due process).

317

Especially given the variety and unpredictability of after-the-fact
remedies, the distinction between prospective and retrospective regulation can be overstated. Further, as with the other points of differentiation I have mentioned, the distinction is not, of course, always
entirely clear. The already discussed problem of nationwide injunctions, for example, may confound this distinction to some degree;
courts may order an injunction on the basis of a defendant's past
behavior that is nonetheless intended to have entirely prospective
effects. 3 18 Despite such forms of overlap, however, it may nonetheless

be useful to distinguish in a rough and flexible way between these two
forms of regulation.
While these distinctions to some extent mirror characteristic differences in the fact patterns of the Hague line of cases and the Edgar
line, this framework differs from current law in making these distinctions clear and explicit. Further, this proposal would involve distinctions that are more nuanced than the relatively stark Hague/Edgar
division. In other words, essentially the same extraterritoriality standard would apply to all these forms of state activity; certain characteristics (the presence of commercial, statutory, and/or prospective
regulatory law) would simply trigger a more careful and searching
inquiry within the same basic framework.
derive benefit from it to internalize the costs associated with it, thereby making sure
that the activity will only be undertaken if it is desired by enough people to cover its
costs. It does not proscribe it altogether." (footnote omitted)); Merrill v. Navegar,
Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146,179 (Ct. App. 1999), rev'd on othergrounds, 28 P.3d 116 (Cal.
2001) (noting that "imposing liability does not reflect as great a condemnation as a
criminal or regulatory prohibition" and citing Calabresi's dissenting opinion in
McCarthy).
317 This distinction also resembles (although it is not identical to) an argument
Regan makes about prospective and retrospective price affirmation laws. Regan
argues that retrospective affirmation laws do not pose an extraterritoriality problem
because they do not attempt to directly govern future behavior (even if they may
inevitably affect such behavior). Regan, supra note 10, at 1904-05.
318 Welkowitz makes this point, noting that an injunction may prohibit the defendant from engaging in future conduct that may be legal in her home state. See
Welkowitz, supra note 11, at 16-18.
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A Final Note: The Case for Revising Both Tests

I close by making two brief final observations about any attempt
to unify and integrate the two standards.
First, it is important to note that the most obvious way of consolidating the Hague and Edgar standards would be to apply one or the
other to all problems of extraterritoriality. On the one hand, we
could have a regime in which all state regulation, like choice-of-law
decisions, is subject only to the fairly minimal "aggregation of contacts" requirement of Hague.319 The dormant Commerce Clause
would of course still apply to such legislation, but only in the form of
the traditional Pike balancing test, without adding any additional layer
of extraterritoriality analysis. This approach might be called the "minimalist solution. '3 20 On the other hand, we could impose a more rigorous extraterritoriality analysis on the acts of courts as well as
319 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981) (plurality opinion).
320 A brisk, clearing-out-the-cobwebs approach to the extraterritoriality problem
that advocates something like the minimalist solution has been proposed in the context of Internet regulation by Jack Goldsmith and Alan Sykes, who frankly acknowledge that their approach "does not accord with some of the Court's overbroad
extraterritoriality dicta." Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 164, at 806. Goldsmith and
Sykes assume, first, that Hague is and should be the prevailing standard for all state
regulation affecting out-of-state conduct. See id. at 806 & n.91. Rather than dispensing with Edgar's concerns, however, they argue that issues of extraterritoriality should
be incorporated into something that looks more like conventional dormant Commerce Clause analysis-in other words, a balancing test that is primarily concerned
with smoking out protectionist or inefficient state regulation. Id. at 797-806 (noting
that the dormant Commerce Clause's function has historically been to prevent efforts
at state protectionism, and advancing a new analysis suggesting that the Clause may
also serve the purpose of ensuring that where "harms cross jurisdictional boundaries, . . . corrective measures are properly calibrated"-that is, not an inefficiently
disproportionate response to the problem). Thus, they argue, courts should "fold[]
the extraterritoriality concern" into a more conventional balancing analysis that
would ask whether a statute "impose[s] burdens on out-of-state actors that outweigh
the in-state benefits." Id. at 804, 806. This language closely echoes the balancing test
of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). This proposal, they argue,
captures much of the Supreme Court's true concerns in cases like Healy and Gore.
Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 164, at 805. In those cases, they argue, the real issue
was that the legislative acts at issue (the beer price limits in Healy and the punitive
damages in Gore) were a disproportionateresponse to an otherwise legitimate desire to
protect in-state residents. Id. Goldsmith and Sykes would treat the problem of inconsistent regulation through a similar balancing test-an approach they see as appropriate to address the real concerns inconsistent regulation raises, the problem that
"different regulatory judgments may create costs of compliance with the various state
regimes that are clearly out of proportion to the benefits of permitting decentralized
regulation." Id. at 807-08. Through this framework, Goldsmith and Sykes argue, it
would be possible to "reconcile[] the extraterritoriality prong of the dormant Coin-
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legislatures-asking, for example, whether a given injunction or an
award of damages has the effect of regulating wholly out-of-state conduct, and invalidating it as improperly extraterritorial if it does (under
either the dormant Commerce Clause, or broader structural principles of federalism). This approach might be called the "higher scrutiny solution."
I want to close by arguing-briefly-that neither of these solutions is desirable. Indeed, the unsuitability of either Hague or Edgar as
a general standard for assessing extraterritoriality may account for the
Supreme Court's failure to unify and harmonize the two lines of cases.
Because both Hague and Edgar have distinct limits, neither one suggests itself as a ready compromise solution that would apply to all
extraterritoriality problems, however they may arise. Devising such a
solution may, then, require a more comprehensive reworking of current law.
The 'higher-scrutiny solution"-in other words, the widespread
application of Edgar to invalidate all state action that reaches extraterritorial conduct-is perhaps the easier of the two to dismiss. It is first
worth noting that such an application of Edgar would represent an
enormous shift from current choice-of-law practices. We are accustomed to a choice-of-law regime that allows state courts much scope to
engage in the kind of de facto regulation that Edgar appears to pro.32 Indeed, it is hard to see how state courts could be permitted
hibitA
to decide any matters involving events in numerous jurisdictions if
they were subject to an absolute bar on pronouncing on out-of-state
conduct. Thus, subjecting state court actions to higher scrutiny would
require a radical rethinking of choice-of-law doctrine and the relationships among state courts-a reappraisal for which there seems no
obvious justification.
This is especially true given that the extraterritorial effects of state
courts' choice-of-law decisionmaking do not pose, at the moment, an
acute crisis for interstate relations or the federal system. It is true that
merce Clause with the scores of choice-of-law decisions that have cross-border effects,
as well as with constitutional limitations on choice of law." Id. at 806.
There is much that is appealing about this framework. It is straightforward and
easy for courts to apply, and represents one way of making sense of current case lawsince, as Goldsmith and Sykes point out, whatever the Court has said about extraterritoriality in cases like Gore and Healy, the results in such cases can be explained in terms
of failure to pass a balancing test. See id. at 805-06. Nonetheless, as the remainder of
this Article goes on to argue, because of the limitations of Hague as the sole substantive limit on state noncommercial legislation, a more thorough reenvisioning of current doctrine may be required.
321 See supra notes 92-105 and accompanying text.
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a few rapidly changing areas of litigation-such as punitive damages
and Internet activity-have raised new and important extraterritoriality concerns. 322 Further, hotly contested issues within more traditional areas of common law-such as the imposition of strict liability
on gun manufacturers-have also inspired litigants to test the limits of
the extraterritoriality principle.323 Nonetheless, the choice-of-law
decisions of state courts-even, indeed particularly, those based on
traditional principles-routinely have the effect of subjecting out-ofstate conduct to standards based on forum law. Such extraterritorial
applications of state law have never been thought to constitute a crisis.
Because the choice-of-law principles applied by state courts are well
known-and litigants recognize that, whenever a state court has jurisdiction, the application of forum law is, more often than not, a reasonable possibility-most such applications of forum law proceed without
occasioning much surprise or unfairness to individuals. 324 Further, in
part because such applications of state law are venerated by tradition,
they are unlikely, especially in routine cases, to raise concerns by
other states about unfair applications of state power. This is particularly so because the privilege of widely applying forum law is reciprocal. State X may, that is, accept the fact that its citizens and events
occurring within its borders may ultimately be governed by standards
imposed by State Y because it may wish its own courts to have the
power to apply forum law to State Y activities. Thus, to adopt the
Edgar extraterritoriality principle in the choice-of-law context would
be a severely disproportionate response to the problem.
322 See discussion supra Parts II.A, II.B.
323 See supra notes 214-26 and accompanying text.
324 A likely reason that punitive damages questions have raised such acute extraterritoriality concerns is simply that the sums involved are so great that they highlight
problems of inconsistency that, in other settings, we have simply learned to live with.
See, e.g., Rachel M. Janutis, FairApportionment of Mulitiple Punitive Damages, 75 Miss.
L.J. 367, 378-90 (2006) (discussing the debate over the Supreme Court's recent punitive damages jurisprudence in reference to extraterritorial concerns); Michael L. Rustad, Happy No More: Federalism Derailed by the Court That Would Be King of Punitive
Damages, 64 MD. L. REv. 461, 461-67 (2005) (discussing the recent Supreme Court
doctrine concerning large punitive damage awards and the extraterritorial ramifications). The imposition of a hundred million dollar judgment may drive a corporation
out of business; it is thus easy to take seriously whatever extraterritoriality concerns
such ajudgment may trigger. By contrast, a small award of compensatory damages in
a tort case against the same corporation may not strike us astproblematic and further
may not be worth it to the corporation to mount a serious constitutional challenge to
it-even if the judgment was based on conduct that was lawful in its home jurisdiction
and thus might seem to raise due process/federalism concerns at least akin to those
discussed in Gore and Campbell.
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Moreover, even if one were to attempt to adopt something like
the Edgar standard, articulating precisely how it should apply would
be difficult. Commentators and lower courts have had difficulty
fathoming Edgars precise limits. 32 5 Even giving Edgar its narrowest

possible reading-supposing, that is, that it applies only to prospective
commercial regulation by state legislatures-many commentators
have assumed that it cannot possibly mean what it literally says, simply
because states have so long been permitted to exert both direct and
de facto regulatory control over events in other jurisdictions.3 26 Once
one accepts that the Edgar standard permits some sort of state regulation of out-of-state events, it is difficult to know where to draw the line
between permissible and problematic extraterritorial regulation.
While some commentators have attempted to articulate where this difference might lie, 3 27 the Supreme Court's actual pronouncements are

sufficiently muddled that it is difficult to find a basis for any such distinction in actual case law.
That leaves us, then, with the "minimalist solution." This solution
is in some respects more appealing. To begin with, it resembles much
more closely the Supreme Court's actual jurisprudence and would
require far less rewriting of current law, since Hague and Shutts often
are said to articulate the outer limits of the extraterritorial application
of state power (at least outside the context of state commercial regulation). 328 It would further recognize the traditional understanding
that, for many years, states have been allowed great latitude in the
choice-of-law principles they have chosen to apply, and that for the
most part this state of affairs has not raised either constitutional or
practical problems. Further, a minimalist standard would continue to
permit some scrutiny, under more traditional dormant Commerce
Clause analysis, in the relatively rare instances when state legislation
appears driven by protectionist purposes or creates serious problems
329
of national inconsistency.
Although these arguments for adopting a more minimalist standard are compelling, a strong case can nonetheless be made for a
reevaluation of the specific framework articulated in Hague. As an ini3 3°
tial matter, the Hague standard has never attracted much praise.
325 See supra notes 165-66, 177-81 and accompanying text.
326 See, e.g., Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 164, at 806 ("[S]cores of choice-of-law
decisions . . . have cross-border effects .
).
327 See id. at 805-06.
328 See supra note 320.
329 See supra note 320.
330 See, e.g., Terry S. Kogan, Toward a Jurisprudenceof Choice of Law: The Priority of
Fairnessover Comity, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 651, 679-82 (1987) (noting that the "fundamen-
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Even regarded purely as an outer limit on choice-of-law doctrine,
Hague has the rather obvious problems of toothlessness (it very rarely
constrains actual decisionmaking by state courts) and redundancy (it
adds little to the personal jurisdiction analysis). When Hague is also
used as the main check on the power of legislatures (at least in situations not involving interstate commerce), it becomes even more problematic. Perhaps the largest difficulty with Hague is the fact that it
simply fails to articulate a theory of the application of forum law as a
means of exercising state power. The standard Hague imposes is
mostly a contact-counting one-and one that appears easily manipulated whenever even tangential contacts are present. 331 By failing to
impose a meaningful test for whether the relevant contacts are connected to genuinely significant state interests, Hague fails to reach the
question of the legitimacy of a sovereign's concern with the behavior
over which it is exerting de facto control.
On the one hand, one could perhaps argue that this limited focus
is appropriate to the choice-of-law standard it announces. In other
words, perhaps there is a due process right to be free from unfair
surprise in applications of state law under choice-of-law rules, regardless of whether the state whose law is being applied might have the
theoretical power to regulate the underlying conduct in appropriate
circumstances. But if this is the principle articulated by Hague, it is, to
begin with, not a very meaningful one, since Hague's very limited
inquiry ensures that, so long as minimum contacts-based personal
jurisdiction is present, the right is unlikely to come into play. 332 Fur-

ther, if this is how we are to understand Hague, the test represents an
extraordinarily poor metric for assessing the proper bounds of legislative activity. Indeed, it is arguably the limitations of Hague that have
resulted in the creeping importation of extraterritoriality principles
designed for legislation into the state choice-of-law context. Unlike
Edgar or Gore, Hague simply provides no hook for courts to consider
structural issues of inconsistent regulation or state overreachingboth of which may also ultimately trigger individual fairness concerns.
Thus, when state power is exerted in a way that seems to raise such
structural problems, courts have been forced to turn to separate lines
33 3
of cases that seem to address them more squarely.

tal weakness" of Hague is that it fails to distinguish among various types of state

contacts).
331
332
333

See supra notes 92-105 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 92-105 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra Part II.
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This Article will not attempt to do more than to briefly suggest a
substantive direction that such a revised extraterritoriality standard
could take. An obvious possibility, however, presents itself: to bring
domestic notions of limits on legislative jurisdiction more in line with
decisions-past and present-governing the extraterritorial reach of
federal law. The international and interstate contexts are, of course,
different; choice-of-law issues in each are guided by different sources
(international norms on the one hand, constitutional provisions like
the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause
on the other), and there is no obvious reason why choice-of-law
approaches for each should be identical in every particular. Nonetheless, the international experience in some respects provides a useful
and much-tested model. In particular, an extraterritoriality standard
could benefit from two ideas that have been advanced in the international setting: first, a focus on within-jurisdiction effects as the basis
for regulation; second, the notion that apparent conflicts between the
regulatory regimes of various jurisdictions can be mediated through
principles of comity.
In the international setting, courts have long grappled with the
question of the extent to which U.S. law should apply abroad. For
many years, courts assessing the reach of U.S. legislation subscribed to
a heavily territorial view of national power-perhaps most famously
articulated in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,334 which pro33 5
nounced that "'[a]ll legislation is prima facie territorial' ,,
and further that "the general and almost universal rule is that the character
of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law

of the country where the act is done.

'3 3 6

This territorial orientation

found expression in a strong presumption "'that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within
33
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.'"

7

United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (ALCOA) ,338 marked a
turn away from the territorial view of national power. ALCOA
334 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
335 Id. at 357 (quoting Ex parte Blain, (1879) 12 Eh. D. 522, 528 (U.K.)).
336 Id. at 356.
337 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (ARAMCO), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting
Foley Bros. Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
338 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); see also ARAMCO, 499 U.S. at 248 (1991) (noting
that, as a protection against "international discord," it is a "longstanding principle of
American law 'that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant
to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States'" (quoting Foley
Bros., 336 U.S. at 285)); Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 23, at 1227 (noting that
ALCOA marked a shift from the vested fights theory in the international context).
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announced a view under which courts would presume that Congress
intended to act in accordance with international norms that permitted liability for extraterritorial conduct having consequences within
the United States. 339

In the wake of ALCOA, courts generally

accepted that much of U.S. law has some extraterritorial application. 340 But some in the international community objected to the
sweeping scope of the effects doctrine and, in response to such criti341
cism, federal courts sought to develop modified versions of the test.
Most famously, in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,3 42 the
Ninth Circuit attempted to develop what it called a 'jurisdictional rule
of reason,' 343 which sought to moderate potential conflicts in antitrust
cases with principles of international "comity and fairness. '3 4 4 Under

Timberlane, courts were to consider a number of factors in assessing
the extraterritorial reach of U.S. law, including the parties' nationality, the likelihood of achieving compliance, the "degree of conflict
with foreign law or policy," the "relative significance of effects on the
United States as compared with those elsewhere," the "extent to which
there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce [and]
the foreseeability of such effect," and the "relative importance to the
violations charged of conduct within the United States as compared
with conduct abroad.

'345

In Hartford Fire Insurance v. California,346 however, the Court
rejected the Timberlane approach and reaffirmed the vitality of effectsbased jurisdiction, finding that the Sherman Act3
339
340

47

applied to "con-

148 F.2d at 443.
See Andrew Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 GEO. LJ. 883, 885

(2002). In some cases, however, the Court has continued to apply a strong presumption against extraterritoriality. A notable example is ARAMCO, in which the Court

held that, in the absence of a clear statement by Congress, it would not construe Title
VII to apply extraterritorially. See 499 U.S. at 255. Congress ultimately overruled the
ARAMCO decision in the 1991 Civil Rights Act. See Smith v. Petra Cablevision Corp.,
793 F. Supp. 417, 419 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
341 See Roger P. Alford, The ExtraterritorialApplication of Antitrust Laws: A Postscript
on Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 213, 215 (1993).
342 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
343 Id. at 613.
344 Id. at 612.
345 Id. at 614-15. Congress ultimately adopted a statutory standard for extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws-permitting application of antitrust laws to
exports only when there is a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect"
within the United States. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006). Courts, however, continued to
interpret that standard in light of the comity concerns of Timberlane. See Alford, supra
note 341, at 216.
346 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
347 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006).

1 130

NOTRE

DAME LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 84:3

duct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States. '348 The Court further found that
courts can impose liability under U.S. law even for conduct that was
lawful in the jurisdiction where it occurred so long as "'a person sub349
ject to regulation by two states can comply with the laws of both,'and that, in the absence of such direct conflict, considerations of
international comity need not come into play.350 Further, the Court's
view of what constituted such a conflict was narrow. In the circumstances at hand, for example, the fact that "Parliament ha d] established a comprehensive regulatory regime over the London
reinsurance market" with which the defendant's alleged conduct was
"perfectly consistent," was not sufficient to find the existence of a
35 1
direct conflict with British law.
Though widely adopted-with some modifications-in other circuits, the Timberlane test was criticized for its vagueness, which some
believed made it too easy for courts inclined to give U.S. law broad
scope to manipulate the factors to permit them to do so. 352 Congress
ultimately adopted a statutory standard for extraterritorial application
of U.S. antitrust laws-permitting application of antitrust laws to
exports only when there is a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" within the United States3 53-but courts continued to
interpret that standard in light of the comity concerns of
354

Timberlane.

Hartford Fire has been criticized for the Court's slighting of comity-based restraints on the reach of statutes. Both the effects test, however, and limitations on the test founded in comity potentially have a
role to play in the interstate context. As a starting point, within-state
effects represent a useful basis for assessing the legitimacy of a state's
concern with a particular activity. If an activity is causing harm within
a given state's borders, it is fair to say that the state has some basis for
being concerned with it. Of course, any response must be proportionate. Regan has argued against a focus on effects, asserting for exam348 Hartford Fire Ins., 509 U.S. at 796.
349 Id. at 799 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403
cmt.e (1987)).
350 See id. at 798-99.
351 Id. In dissent, Justice Scalia objected strongly to this view, arguing that Congress should be presumed to act in accordance with principles of international comity
that did not support jurisdiction in this case. See id. at 818-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
352 See Alford supra note 341, at 216.
353 Congress adopted this standard in the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement
Act (FTAIA) of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, tit. IV, § 402, 96 Stat. 1246, 1246 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006)).
354 See Alford, supra note 341, at 217.
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pie that Michigan cannot prohibit cigarette production in North
Carolina even if such production causes great harm to Michigan's
residents. 355 The problem with such regulation, however, is arguably
that it sweeps too broadly, regulating activity even beyond the extent
to which it affects Michigan's residents. By contrast, imposing strict
liability under Michigan law for harm caused by tobacco use would
35 6
not necessarily represent an excessive response.
A focus on effects would also fill a gap in the framework established by Edgar. Edgar,of course, does not include any consideration
of effects either-in fact, it explicitly prohibits regulation of out-ofstate commerce even if such activity "has effects within the State. 3 5 7
This leaves us with the curious situation of one extraterritoriality test
(Edgar) that prohibits out-of-state regulation even if the out-of-state
activity causes significant in-state consequences and another (Hague)
that permits de facto state control over out-of-state activity even if such
activity has minimal impact within the state.
One could make the argument that existing constitutional limits
on choice of law in fact incorporate a sort of implicit effects test. It is
first important to note that, at the subconstitutional level, the choiceof-law rules that states actually apply frequently take into account
where the effects of the conduct at issue have been felt in the determination of which jurisdiction's law to apply. 358 This is perhaps especially true of modern theories incorporating interest analysis: if a
jurisdiction has an interest in the dispute that may support the application of its law, it is generally because the dispute affects it in some
way. 359 Further, although the Supreme Court has never required state

courts to apply any particular choice-of-law rule, it suggested in Shutts
355 Regan, supra note 10, at 1899-900. In Regan's hypothetical, Michigan cannot
simply address the problem by banning cigarettes within state borders, since cigarettes are smuggled from North Carolina. Id.
356 Indeed, courts routinely make decisions that have this sort of effect by applying
their own law to out-of-state conduct. For example, in Bernhard v. Harrah'sClub, 546
P.2d 719 (Cal. 1976) (en banc), California applied a California statute to find a
Nevada tavern-keeper potentially liable for harm caused in California as a result of his
furnishing alcohol to an intoxicated patron in Nevada. Id. at 720, 725-26. As the
court reasoned, "[i]t seems clear that California cannot reasonably effectuate its policy if it does not extend its regulation to include out-of-state tavern-keepers such as
defendant who regularly and purposely sell intoxicating beverages to California
residents [who are likely to return to the state]." Id. at 725.
357 Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642-43 (1982) (plurality opinion).
358 Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and InterstateFederalism in the Law of Personal
Jurisdiction,65 TEx. L. REv. 689, 733 (1987).
359 Guzman, supra note 54, at 894; Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritorialityin U.S.
Patent Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2119, 2167 (2008).
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that to be relevant for choice-of-law purposes, contacts should be tied
to something "'done or to be done within"' state borders. 360 Gore,
too, appears to announce something of an effects test in its suggestion
that punitive damages can only be assessed based on conduct that has
an "impact" on the state or its residents.3 61 An effects test thus seems
at the very least harmonious with current law and practice, even if the
Supreme Court has not incorporated it explicitly into either the
Hague standard or to the Edgar extraterritoriality principle.
Effects also, of course, come into play in some forms of personal
jurisdiction. As the Court famously held in Calder v. Jones,36 2 California could exercise personal jurisdiction over a Florida newspaper in a
libel suit concerning an article that "concerned the California activities of a California resident," thus ensuring that "the brunt of the
3 63
harm" caused by the alleged libel would be suffered in California.
Under these circumstances, the Court found, jurisdiction over the
Florida defendants was proper "based on the 'effects' of their Florida
conduct in California. '3 6 4 Indeed, given that minimum contacts-based personal jurisdiction is both a more robustly developed
area of doctrine and one that is often believed to encompass structural federalism concerns that states not exert too much power
outside territorial limits, , 65 one might argue that a broader and more
carefully articulated set of choice-of-law restrictions is superfluous.
Despite the relevance of effects to personal jurisdiction, however,
a place still exists for considering effects in choice of law as well. Most
obviously, consideration of effects is confined to the minimum contacts-based theories of personal jurisdiction, and has no role in per360 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985) (quoting Home Ins.
Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 410 (1930)).
361 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572-73 (1996).
362 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
363 Id. at 788-89.
364 Id. at 789. Some courts have understood the Caldertest to permit effects-based
personal jurisdiction even where the relevant conduct is not wrongful or tortious. See
Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1207
(9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) ("[W]e must evaluate all of a defendant's contacts with the
forum state, whether or not those contacts involve wrongful activity by the defendant."). The Ninth Circuit also sought to clarify the language in Calderby explaining
that the effects test did not requirethat the brunt of the harm be suffered in the forum
state: "If ajurisdictionally sufficient amount of harm is suffered in the forum state, it
does not matter that even more harm might have been suffered in another state." Id.
365 See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 128, at 181 (arguing that personal jurisdiction
rules derive from "federal common law formulated to promote interstate federalism"); Welkowitz, supra note 11, at 48-49 ("[T]he Supreme Court often has viewed
personal jurisdiction as a reflection of extraterritorial limits . . ").
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sonal jurisdiction based on consent or presence. Even in the
minimum contacts realm, effects-based analysis is sometimes limited
to suits based on tortious conduct, and is not the framework that
applies to suits in contract. 366 Further, where a defendant has extensive contacts with a forum, courts may exert general jurisdiction over
that defendant even in matters unrelated to the forum-meaning that
there may not necessarily be any connection between the particular
matters at issue and the forum notwithstanding the existence of per367
sonal jurisdiction.
A second way in which the international context could come into
play is in the notion that states can use principles of comity to reconcile apparently contradictory state regulation. Although the
Timberlane standard is of course no longer the law in assessing the
extraterritorial reach of federal statutes,36 8 the framework it sets forth
nonetheless has continuing potential to be useful in interstate extraterritoriality questions. Indeed, in the interstate context, the considerations of comity articulated in Timberlane are potentially even more
relevant given that multijurisdictional transactions are so common,
indeed routine, in the interstate context. A set of comity principles
would not impose precise requirements on states, but would simply
ask them to consider the extraterritorial impact-including the potential for inconsistency-that might ensue if forum law is imposed in a
36 9
given situation.
This brief discussion is not, of course, intended to be full-fledged
advocacy for the ALCOA or Timberlane standard in the interstate context-a separate project that would require a far fuller analysis. It is
simply designed to suggest that both Edgar and Hague embody only
half, at best, of the picture of how state power is exercised. For that
reason, it seems likely that a new, integrated standard will have to go
in a different direction. The international standard provides at least a
suggestive model of what that standard might resemble.
366 See Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1206.
367 Welkowitz also makes the argument that the existence of general jurisdiction
makes personal jurisdiction a possibly inadequate check on state power. See
Welkowitz, supra note 11, at 56-57.
368 See McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 813 n.8 (9th Cir. 1988)
(explaining that § 6a of title 15 of the U.S. Code supersedes Timberlane's test for
assessing the extraterritorial reach of federal antitrust law).
369 Integrating comity concerns into the effects test would also help to answer
some of the criticisms of the test that have been made in the international contextincluding the arguments that legislation of extraterritorial conduct inherently lacks
democratic legitimacy and invites piecemeal solutions to problems involving multiple
jurisdictions. See Austen Parrish, The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality'sFifth Business, 61
VAND. L. REv. 1455, 1483-93 (2008) (summarizing such criticisms).
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CONCLUSION

One means by which states can exercise extraterritorial power is
through state courts' application of forum law to out-of-state events.
While this power is perhaps not identical in all respects to the power a
state legislature exercises when it enacts an extraterritorial regulation,
both powers have fundamental similarities and raise the same concerns of due process and interstate harmony. The Supreme Court has
historically failed to grapple with this basic unity between the two powers, despite the fact that various areas of jurisprudence have called
into question the viability of separating the constitutional treatment of
state courts' choice-of-law decisions from that of extraterritorial state
regulation. Treating these similar powers similarly, in contrast to current practice, would be one way of bringing clarity and sense to this
famously murky and unsettled area of law.

